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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic considerations dominate the analysis of patent law.1  The 
most often used theory for the justification of the patent system is the 
“incentive to invent” theory, which focuses on the role of patents in 
providing adequate economic incentives to invest in technological 
 
∗ Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College. LL.B., 1997, The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem; LL.M., 
1999, Columbia Univ.; LL.D., 2009, The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem. The author expresses his 
gratitude to Leah Chan Grinvald, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, James Alexander McElroy Marks and 
Michal Shur-Ofry, for their helpful comments and suggestions.  
 1. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-
Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (surveying many of the economic 
justifications for the patent system offered over the years). 
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research and development.2  Pursuant to this theory, absent exclusive 
legal rights to use an invention, there would be no incentive to invent, as 
free riders may imitate the invention and drive down its market price to a 
level that would not allow the inventor to recoup her research and 
development costs and make a reasonable profit.3  By providing legal 
exclusivity, patents overcome this market failure and provide the 
missing incentive to engage in inventive activity, thus benefiting society.  
The “incentive to invent” theory has been complemented by other 
theories, including the “incentive to disclose” theory4 and the “prospect” 
theory,5 all of which set out to justify the need for a patent system from 
an economic point of view.6  
The economic justifications for the patent system have not gone 
unchallenged.  Over the years, the various purported economic benefits 
of the patent system have been called into question.  A central argument 
criticizing the “incentive to invent” theory has been that government 
intervention is not necessary to secure incentives to invent.  As the 
argument goes, inventions are developed, with or without patents, when 
 
 2. See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 632 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=413001; Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent 
Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 791-92 (1992).  It should be noted that incentives (to create) play a 
very significant role in the analysis of copyright law as well.  See generally Christina Bohannan, 
Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 969 (2007); 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577 
(2009).  In fact, the incentive-based justification for patent law and for copyright law has roots in 
the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries”.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.    
 3. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 4. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.  
 5. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
 6. For additional economic theories, see, for example, F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and 
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (suggesting 
justification to the patent system, which is based on the need to provide “incentive to 
commercialize” the invention); Gordon, supra note 2, at 632 (listing various theoretical 
justifications for the patent system, including the “incentive to design around” theory); Clarisa 
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002) (formulating the “signaling” theory, which 
focuses on the role played by patents in spreading information about the firms holding them); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005) 
(presenting the “patent portfolio” theory, pursuant to which the true value of patents does not lie in 
their individual worth but in their aggregation into a patent portfolio); and Paul J. Heald, A 
Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005) (suggesting a “transaction 
costs” theory, which focuses on the function performed by the patent system in reducing transaction 
costs compared to the available alternative system for protection, i.e., trade secrecy).    
2
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the state of the art and other relevant circumstances allow for it.7  There 
is, in fact, no conclusive empirical evidence establishing that patents are 
necessary to incentivize innovation.8  
Even if the benefits of the patent system were unquestioned, they 
must be balanced against the costs associated with the patent system, 
which include, most significantly, the deadweight loss resulting from 
non-competitive pricing of patented inventions.9  Scholars analyzing 
patent law within an economic framework typically seek out a design of 
the relevant legal rules that will maximize the benefits while minimizing 
the costs of the patent system.  This type of cost-benefit analysis, 
naturally, does not always lead to conclusive recommendations.  Indeed, 
in some cases, such analysis may lead to a dead end.10  Measuring the 
costs and benefits associated with each existing or suggested legal rule 
affecting the patent system has proven to be particularly challenging.11  
Ultimately, it has been impossible to definitively determine whether 
current patent law, in the United States or elsewhere, reflects an optimal 
balancing of the multiple considerations at stake.12    
Yet, economic rationales are not the only possible justifications for 
the patent system.  The labor theory, pursuant to which every person has 
a right to the fruits of her labor,13 and the personality theory, which 
focuses on the function of private property as a means for developing 
and realizing one’s personality,14 offer alternative justifications.  Unlike 
the economic approach, which justifies individual rights by pointing at 
the benefits to society associated with their existence, the labor and 
 
 7. See, e.g., Ko, supra note 2, at 792.  For a recent empirical study showing that the 
“orthodox” assumption that patents spur technological innovation is not necessarily true, see 
Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 130, 166-67 (2009). 
 8. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, STUDY 
NO. 15, at 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (written by Fritz Machlup) (stating that “[i]f we did not have a 
patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic 
consequences, to recommend instituting one.  But since we have had a patent system for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing 
it”); see also John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and 
Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 453 (1996). 
 9. See generally infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1031 (1989) (noting that the incentive theories are 
“analytical dead ends for those seeking to fine tune the patent laws”). 
 11. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 12. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1031-32 (noting the difficulty in determining 
whether the current level of incentives supplied by the patent system is too high or too low). 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
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personality theories view the interests of individuals in property as 
interests worthy of protection in themselves and not just as a means to 
the end of promoting the general welfare.15  While these theories are 
more commonly used in the analysis of property law or copyright law, 
they are not often relied upon in the context of patent law, where the 
analysis has been predominately governed by economic considerations.  
The potential applicability of these theories to rights in technological 
inventions has, in fact, been examined by certain scholars.16  However, 
the scholarly treatment of such theories has typically remained on a 
general philosophical level, while the actual use of non-utilitarian 
considerations to supplement economic theory in the analysis of current 
patent law cases and policy problems is not common.17  This Article 
challenges this one-dimensional approach and calls for a more frequent 
use of non-utilitarian considerations in discussions of the patent system.  
To be sure, this Article does not call for the complete abolition of 
economic analysis of patent law, which, despite its shortcomings, 
remains the most important tool in the evaluation of legal rules in this 
arena, where the vast majority of the players are motivated primarily by 
economic considerations.18  However, it does call for a broader use of 
non-economic considerations, particularly those embedded in the labor 
theory and the personality theory, alongside the economic analysis.  As 
will be shown in detail below, these non-utilitarian justifications for 
property rights are, to a great extent, applicable to rights in inventions.  
When a person develops a technological product, she invests her labor in 
the process and, according to the labor theory, she is therefore entitled to 
rights over the invention, subject to certain conditions that will be 
discussed below.  At the same time, an invention often reflects the 
personality of its inventor, and thus, patents may be justified under the 
personality theory as well.  This Article argues that an examination of 
patent law under the framework of these non-utilitarian theories may 
offer significant guidance for policymakers in certain instances where 
the economic analysis does not point to a definitive solution.  
Furthermore, according such theories greater weight in the analysis of 
patent law may ultimately result in a patent system that not only serves 
 
 15. See infra text accompanying note 62-63 (with respect to the labor theory) and notes 151-
53 (with respect to the personality theory).  
 16. See infra note 88 (with respect to the labor theory) and note 166 (with respect to the 
personality theory). 
 17. See also infra text following note 93. 
 18. In fact, as mentioned before, the economic role of intellectual property law has a 
constitutional basis.  See supra note 2. 
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its prescribed economic goals, but also promotes other important goals, 
such as providing just reward for labor and enabling individuals to 
develop their personality.   
As a case in point, cumulative innovation will be used in this 
Article to highlight the ways in which the non-utilitarian theories 
referenced above can assist policymakers in areas where the economic 
analysis of patent law cannot provide conclusive answers.  The term 
“cumulative innovation” refers to situations where an inventor uses a 
previously patented invention in order to develop her own invention.  
This setting poses a special challenge in the design of patent law, as the 
interests of more than one inventor must be given due consideration.  
While cumulative innovation is far from a new phenomenon,19 
policymakers in the patent field are still in disagreement as to the proper 
way to approach it.  The economic analysis of patent law, in particular, 
does not definitively resolve many of the issues raised in this setting.  
Cumulative innovation has not been analyzed from any perspective other 
than the economic one.  This Article will show how the analysis under 
the labor and personality theories can add weight to certain conclusions 
arising out of the economic analysis, can lend support to an argument or 
a counter-argument in matters that are unresolved under the economic 
analysis, and in some contexts, shed light on important issues that do not 
arise under the economic analysis yet warrant the attention of 
policymakers.  For example, one of the novel conclusions of the analysis 
under the personality theory is that inventors should be granted a right of 
attribution in connection with follow-on inventions. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part II provides the necessary 
background with respect to the economic analysis of patent law in 
general and the economic analysis of cumulative innovation in 
particular.20  Part II also highlights the shortcomings of such analyses.  
Parts III and IV present the theories at the center of this Article—the 
labor theory and the personality theory, respectively—and analyze the 
case of cumulative innovation in light of each of these theories.  Part V 
concludes with a summary and specific recommendations, including 
proposals to adopt a wide experimental use exception, to include the 
 
 19. As early as 1675, Sir Isaac Newton noted: “If I have seen further it is only by standing on 
the shoulders of giants.”  Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (Winter 1991)  (quoting Letter from Isaac 
Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675)). 
 20. See generally Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of 
Incentives, 50 IDEA 723 (2010) (analyzing cumulative innovation from the point of view of the 
“incentive to invent” theory). 
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exploitation of follow-on inventions within the scope of the original 
patent, and to apply liability rules in case the inventors fail to reach a 
voluntary agreement allowing such exploitation. 
II.  BACKGROUND:  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PATENT LAW  
A. General 
As mentioned above, the traditional analysis of patent law focuses 
on the economic benefits of the patent system.  The most common 
justification for the patent system is the “incentive to invent” theory, 
according to which in a world without patents, inventors would lack an 
economic incentive to invest in research and development.  This is so 
because of the “public good” characteristics of an invention:  non-
excludability (once competitors of the inventor have found out about an 
invention, it is difficult to prevent them from using it without paying) 
and non-rivalry (the use of the invention by one does not prevent 
simultaneous use by others).21  Thus, despite the potentially high social 
value of an invention, an inventor may lack adequate incentive to 
develop it, absent some type of protection against competition from free 
riders.  Patent law provides such protection by granting the inventor 
exclusive rights to her invention for a limited period of time, during 
which she should be able to cover her research and development costs 
and make a reasonable profit in the market for her invention. 
Over the years, the “incentive to invent” theory has been the subject 
of a variety of challenges.  One line of criticism is that state intervention 
is not really necessary to secure an incentive to invent.  Not all inventors 
are driven by economic motives.22  Even those who invent for purely 
 
 21. The combination of these characteristics creates the potential for sub-investment in the 
production of public goods in general and inventions in particular.  See generally Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 
108 YALE L.J. 377 (1998) (discussing the provision of public goods).  For the public goods nature 
of inventions, see, for example, Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003). 
 22. Alternative motives to invent may be the prospect of gaining professional reputation and 
fame amongst colleagues or sheer intellectual curiosity.  See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 738; see 
also Gordon, supra note 2, at 632 (noting that the existence of reputational advantages might reduce 
the need for a patent system).  Cf., e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did 
We Just Imagine That?, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1515964 (challenging the traditional incentive justification for 
copyright law, while drawing on behavioral studies that suggest that intrinsic factors are much more 
important determinants of participation in creative work than such extrinsic ones as monetary 
reward); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. 
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economic reasons can be protected from competition by the existence of 
high production and imitation costs, which may deter free riders, or can 
at least be allowed to enjoy a head start in the market until such free 
riders reveal the workings of the invention.23  This criticism cannot serve 
to completely negate justification for the patent system, as studies show 
that at least in some industries inventors do rely on patents to supply an 
incentive.24  However, it certainly calls into question the ability to base 
the entire justification for the patent system, with its broad application to 
a vast array of technological fields, solely on the “incentive to invent” 
theory. 
Two other theories of note which suggest economic justifications 
for the patent system are the “incentive to disclose” theory and the 
“prospect” theory.  The incentive to disclose theory focuses on the role 
that patents purportedly play in promoting disclosure of the information 
underlying a new invention by its inventor.25  The main criticism of this 
theory is that in many cases, an invention’s working cannot be kept 
secret once it has been commercialized.26  In the few cases where 
secrecy is feasible, the inventor would typically avoid registering a 
patent for her invention because she would rather keep it secret to enjoy 
trade secret protection, which may last for an indefinite period of time.27  
The prospect theory, formulated by Kitch, posits that the main 
justification for the patent system is that it increases the efficiency in 
allocation of resources for technological development by granting 
ownership to the inventor in the technological prospect derived from her 
 
& MARY L. REV. 513 (2009) (exploring the ways in which the desire to create can be free from the 
need for economic incentive). 
 23. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1026; Ko, supra note 2, at 794. 
 24. For recent empirical evidence of the role that patents play in the biotechnology industry, 
see Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 4 (2009).  As to the importance of patents in 
the pharmaceutical industry, see, for example, Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the 
Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 569 (2009).  For studies comparing the value of 
patents in different industries, see, for example, John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s 
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2125 
(2000) (suggesting a possibility that patents are considered more important in the chemical, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological fields than in other fields); John R. Allison et al., Valuable 
Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 471-76 (2004) (discussing differences in patent litigation patterns 
between various industries and concluding that patents in some industries are more likely to be 
valuable than patents in other industries). 
 25. See generally Gordon, supra note 2, at 632; Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1028-29; Julie S. 
Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CAL. 
L. REV. 179, 189-90 (1998). 
 26. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1028-29. 
 27. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. 
ECON. 611, 620 n.31 (2009), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patrev.pdf.  
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invention.28  This theory has never gained wide support amongst 
scholars analyzing the patent system and it has been the subject of 
criticism, doubting particularly the ability and motivation of an inventor 
to engage in further development of the prospect derived from her 
original invention.29   
Alongside the purported benefits of patents outlined above, 
economic discussion of patent law has also highlighted certain costs 
associated with the patent system, including the deadweight loss 
resulting from non-competitive pricing of the patented invention,30 the 
waste caused by the rent-seeking behavior of inventors engaging in a 
race to the patent office, 31 and the potential chilling effect of patents on 
follow-on research, which is manifested in the cumulative innovation 
setting.32  Any attempt to design patent law based on economic theory 
must confront the trade-off between the desire to maximize incentives—
to invent, disclose, or develop the “prospect”—and the need to minimize 
costs.33  For example, it could be suggested that in order to supply 
incentives in the maximum amount of cases, the exclusivity period 
provided by patents should be indefinite.34  Yet, this solution also 
maximizes patent costs.  The larger the economic reward, the more 
 
 28. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977). 
 29. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871-79 (1990); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of 
Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004) (critically examining the “prospect” theory).   
 30. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 2, at 249-51; Kitch, supra note 28, at 266-67; Merges & 
Nelson, supra note 29, at 871; Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative 
Systems Technology, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2674, 2676 (1994). 
 31. See, e.g., Michelle Armond, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to Motions 
for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L. REV. 117, 142-43 (2003); 
Dam, supra note 2, at 251-52; Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 
78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308 (1992).   
 32. For a more comprehensive list of costs, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 737. 
 33. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969), for one of the most influential studies of the 
patent system, which discusses the basic trade-off between the desire to provide an incentive to 
invent and the social loss resulting from the monopolistic pricing by the patent owner, in an attempt 
to figure out optimal patent length.  This article has served as the basis for many other studies of the 
patent system focusing on the above-mentioned trade-off.  See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl 
Shapiro, Optimum Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How 
Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990) (attempting to find 
the combination of patent length and patent scope that would ensure a given amount of profit to the 
inventor while minimizing monopolistic cost). 
 34. Cf. Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 31 (arguing that “the only way to ensure that firms 
undertake every research project that is efficient is to let the firms collect as revenue all the social 
value they create”).  But see Gordon, supra note 2, at 622 (claiming that “no one would suggest that 
IP should internalize all the benefits that flow from an intangible”). 
8
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inventions will supposedly be developed, but the costs associated with 
patents will also increase unnecessarily with respect to inventions that 
would have been developed otherwise.35   
Reaching definitive conclusions regarding the optimal design of 
patent law based on economic analysis is, thus, a difficult task.36  What 
complicates things even further is that the current level of incentives 
created by the patent system, as well as the effect of any suggested 
change in the laws on such incentives and on the costs associated with 
the system, is very difficult to measure, as policymakers lack accurate 
information with respect to the relevant parameters, such as the research 
and development costs associated with the development of various 
inventions.37  The fact that the patent system, with its “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, applies to various technological fields, which broadly differ 
from one another with respect to various relevant parameters, 
complicates things even further.38  To be sure, even if economic analysis 
could be used to clearly point out the direction that needs to be taken by 
policymakers—increasing or decreasing the strength of patents—it 
generally offers no guidance “in evaluating the relevant merits of 
different packages of patent rights” that may achieve such an overall 
effect.39  For all these reasons, it is not possible to reach accurate 
recommendations with respect to the optimal design of patent law based 
on economic analysis alone.    
B. Economic Analysis of Cumulative Innovation 
As explained above, the term “cumulative innovation” refers to 
situations where an inventor uses a previously patented invention in the 
development process of her own invention.40  Cumulative innovation 
cases can be roughly classified into a few categories, including, most 
 
 35. See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 98 (2006); Gordon, supra 
note 2, at 632; Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 31.  
 36. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent 
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2081-82 (2000) (noting the “indeterminacy of economic analysis 
in evaluating the patent system”).  
 37. Surely, policymakers cannot rely in this respect on information submitted by the 
inventors.  See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 740 n.66.  See generally Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 
1030-31 (pointing out that the economic theories do not supply an answer to the empirical question 
of how much incentive is necessary). 
 38. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155 (2002) (describing the one-size-fits-all nature of the patent 
system). 
 39. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1030-31. 
 40. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 731.  
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importantly,41 (1) the basic technology-applications category,42 (2) the 
improvements category,43 and (3) the research tools category.44  In all 
these situations, there is concern that the patent for the first invention 
will delay or even prohibit the activity of the second inventor.  This is 
not just a theoretical concern and there are numerous examples—from 
the early days of the radio industry to modern day—of cases in which a 
patent had a chilling effect on follow-on research and development in 
the relevant field.45   
The economic analysis of patent law has traditionally focused on 
the process leading to the development of an isolated invention and on 
the costs associated with the grant of exclusive rights in such invention, 
while ignoring the possibility that an invention can also serve as an input 
in the development process of follow-on inventions.46  Cumulative 
innovation places an additional burden on the patent system as the 
interests of more than one inventor must be taken into account and 
weighed against each other.47  From the perspective of the “incentive to 
invent” theory, the challenge is to design patent law in a manner 
ensuring a division of profits between the inventors that allows each one 
to cover her costs and make a sufficient profit.48  Policymakers are thus 
 
 41. The following list is not exhaustive.  For a more comprehensive list of scenarios, see id. at 
731-32.  See also SCOTCHMER, supra note 35, at 132 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1868 (2003).  
 42. In this scenario, the patented invention is a basic technology—such as laser technology—
which forms the basis for a variety of applications in multiple technological fields.  For additional 
examples, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, 731 n.22. 
 43. In this category, the follow-on invention is an improvement of the patented invention.  
Improvements are common in many industries.  For various examples, see id. at 731 n.23. 
 44. In this scenario, the patented invention serves as a research tool in the development 
process of the follow-on invention, though ultimately, it is not embedded in it.  There are many 
patented inventions whose sole purpose is to serve as a research tool.  For various examples from 
the biotechnology and nanotechnology fields, see id. at 732.   
 45. Id. at 732-33.  For a thorough study of the history of science in this respect, see Merges & 
Nelson, supra note 29, at 884-908.  
 46. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 29, at 868 (claiming that in most discussions of 
the patent system, emphasis is placed on the basic trade-off between incentives to the inventor and 
sub-use of her invention as a result of monopolistic rights granted to her); Nelson, supra note 30, at 
2676 (arguing that the problems associated with the grant of strong patent rights in cumulative 
technologies are not adequately dealt with in the standard isolated invention model). 
 47. Cf. Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 30 (“The challenge is to reward early innovators fully for 
the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward later innovators 
adequately for their improvements and new products as well”).  
 48. Cf. SCOTCHMER, supra note 35, at 135; Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators: 
Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable?, 27 RAND J. ECON. 322, 322 (1996) (“The 
possible division of R&D effort among many firms places an additional burden on the patent 
system.  Not only must it try to ensure that research firms earn enough profit in total to cover the 
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confronted with a new trade-off on top of the basic trade-off between 
incentives and costs.49  The more we strengthen the rights of the original 
inventor in order to increase her incentive to invent—i.e., by increasing 
her control over the development and use of follow-on inventions—the 
more we hurt the incentives of others to develop follow-on inventions. 
Yet, the more we strengthen the rights of follow-on inventors—i.e., by 
broadening their freedom to develop and commercialize their 
inventions—the more we hurt the incentive of the original inventor.  
Confronted with such a complicated challenge and considering the 
general shortcomings of the economic analysis described above, it is not 
surprising that scholars and policymakers in the patent arena are still in 
disagreement as to the proper means to deal with cumulative innovation.   
Admittedly, there are certain principles which are widely agreed 
upon by scholars dealing with cumulative innovation.  First, it is agreed 
by most scholars that at least a certain degree of freedom to engage in 
cumulative research and development must be ensured.50  Second, it is 
generally assumed that a follow-on inventor who has managed to 
develop an invention that meets the general criteria for patent eligibility 
should be able to register a patent for it.51  Third, it is generally 
acknowledged that the original patentee has to be compensated 
somehow for the use of her invention.52  
 
total costs of R&D, but in addition the profit must be divided among them such that each firm 
covers its costs”). 
 49. For a presentation of the matter as a trade-off, see for example ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH 
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS 
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 48–49 (2004); Dam, 
supra note 2, at 253, 266-67; Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative 
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34, 35 (1995). 
 50. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1078; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights 
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 224-26 (1987); Irving N. 
Feit, Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 71 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 819, 839-41 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: 
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 
76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 66 (2001); Tom Saunders, Case Comment, Renting Space on the Shoulders of 
Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 268 (2003); 
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 119-52 (2004); Wendy Thai, Toward Facilitating Access to Patented 
Research Tools, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 373, 390-97 (2004).  But see Jordan P. Karp, 
Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 
2169, 2188 (1991) (arguing against a broad experimental use exception). 
 51. This is, in fact, so widely agreed upon, that there are hardly any discussions in the 
literature with respect to this matter.  For an exception, see Scotchmer, supra note 48. 
 52. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1077-78; Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts 
over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument 
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However, there are many questions related to the matter that do not 
enjoy consensus among scholars, and economic theory does not provide 
definitive answers to these questions.  Some of these questions are 
fundamental in nature.  For example, there is no consensus among 
scholars as to the principal question of which regime—one that allows 
for competition in the market for follow-on inventions or one that places 
exclusive control of the technological prospect derived from the original 
invention at the hands of its inventor—is a more efficient environment 
for technology development.53  Another key matter which is disputed 
among scholars is the extent to which it is reasonable to expect inventors 
in a cumulative innovation setting to come to a voluntary agreement 
allowing for the development and/or commercialization of a follow-on 
invention while dividing the profits in a manner preserving their 
respective incentives to invent.54  The lack of conclusive evidence on 
 
for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1679, 1683 (2001); 
Mueller, supra note 50, at 9-10. 
 53. Compare Kitch, supra note 28 (supporting a wide patent to the original patentee, granting 
her control over the prospect derived from her invention), with Merges & Nelson, supra note 29 
(arguing that the grant of exclusive control of the prospect to the original patentee may actually 
stifle technological development in the field).  See also Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 734-35 
(pointing out that the original inventor may not always possess the requisite incentive and ability to 
develop follow-on inventions, and hence, competition must be allowed).  
 54. Many scholars have expressed pessimism as to the efficiency of the market for licenses, 
while pointing at the particularly high transaction costs and other factors that make it difficult for 
the parties to come to an agreement in this setting.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1052-65 (1997); Merges & Nelson, 
supra note 29, at 874-75; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000);  see also Jay Dratler, Jr., Invention is a Process, or Why the 
Electronics and Pharmaceutical Industries are at Loggerheads over Patents 26 (U. of Akron Legal 
Studies Research, Paper No. 06-13, July 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=899924; 
Jay Dratler, Jr., Combinatorial Mathematics and the Problem of Early-Stage Patents in 
Biotechnology 1 (U. of Akron Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 07-02, Jan. 2007), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=959462; Jay Dratler, Jr., Fixing Our Broken Patent System, 14 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47, 56 (2010) (noting the high transaction costs associated with the 
need to secure consent of early stage patentees for a follow-on project, which rise significantly as 
the number of such early patents increases).  However, certain recent empirical studies suggest that 
these concerns may be more theoretical than practical.  See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., Effects of 
Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (providing survey 
results indicating that the patenting of research tools in the biomedical industry has generally not 
been viewed as having a substantial negative effect on further research in the field).  The main 
explanation for the results supplied in Walsh’s study is that firms and universities have been able to 
develop “working solutions” that allow their research to proceed, including the emergence of a 
licensing practice.  Id. at 286.  The authors state their opinion that “it is typically not that difficult to 
contract” and state that licensing is routine in the drug industry.  Id. at 322.   
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such fundamental matters underlies some of the disagreements among 
scholars as to the proper way to design patent law in this context.55  
Alongside such principal matters, there are also many unresolved 
questions that relate to the finer details of the optimal legal regime.56  
For example, even among scholars who are in support of a relatively 
wide experimental use exception in patent law, which allows for certain 
experimental uses of the invention to take place during the patent period 
without the patentee’s advance permission, there is no agreement as to 
whether and how such an exception should be qualified to distinguish 
between permissible and non-permissible activities.57  Another 
unresolved matter is the appropriate manner for compensating the 
 
 55. For a “battle” of scholars that seems to stem from the basic disagreement on the efficiency 
level of the market for licenses, see for example Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); F. Scott Kieff, 
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A 
Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific 
Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001).  Whereas 
Rai argues that in light of high transaction costs, property protection for upstream research results 
should be weakened, Kieff supports the patenting of basic research while relying on the ability of 
the market to ensure efficient utilization of the patented inventions.  
 56. The following list of unresolved questions is not meant to be exhaustive.  
 57. One suggestion that has been made in the literature is to make a distinction based on 
whether the research user is motivated by profit or not.  See, e.g., Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use 
as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 357, 377 (1957); cf. Gitter, supra note 52, 
at 1628, 1679 (suggesting that different rules are to be applied with respect to commercially driven 
research and other research).  This is, in fact, the position taken by the U.S. judiciary.  See, e.g., 
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating the narrow 
construction of the experimental use exception); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 
858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994) (holding the 
experimental use exception to be truly narrow and not applicable when the allegedly infringing use 
has “definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes”); Ares-Serono, Inc. v. 
Organon Int’l B.V., 862 F. Supp. 603, 608 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1994) (clarifying that “[t]he 
experimental use exception does not protect experiments or tests which have a commercial 
purpose”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., No. 73-58, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17411, at *12 
(C.D. Cal. July 20, 1982) (holding that experimental use “cannot be invoked for the protection of 
one who uses a patented invention commercially”).  For criticism of this position, see, for example, 
Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1023-24, 1035.  Another distinction suggested in the literature is 
between research users who compete with the patent owner in the same market and research users 
who are “regular consumers” of the invention, as in the research tools scenario.  See, e.g., 
Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1074-78; Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 225; DAVID GILAT, II STUDIES, 
EXPERIMENTAL USE AND PATENTS 44 (1995); Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an 
Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 638-41 (1985).  Yet, 
this suggestion as well has not been unanimously agreed to by scholars attending to the matter.  See, 
e.g., Gitter, supra note 52, at 1684-85 (proposing the application of the experimental use exception 
with respect to noncommercial research in DNA sequences); Thai, supra note 50, at 393-97 
(suggesting the exemption of certain uses of research tools in university research); Tur-Sinai, supra 
note 20, at 756-57 (supporting a broad application of the experimental use exception with respect to 
research tools).  
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original inventor for the use of her invention.  Should such compensation 
be limited to cases where a successful follow-on invention was 
developed and be based on the actual level of market profits, or should 
compensation be given for the mere use of the original invention even 
where such use did not result in the successful development of a follow-
on invention?58  Should there be cases where a complete exemption—
i.e., an exception covering the commercialization stage, and not only the 
development stage—is granted to the follow-on inventor, and what 
should be the grounds for such exemption?59  In cases that do not fall 
under such exemption, should the consent of the original patentee for the 
commercialization of a follow-on invention always be required, or is it 
more efficient to apply liability rule doctrines in this context, at least 
under certain circumstances, allowing the follow-on inventor to exploit 
her invention even without permission in return for an appropriate 
royalty to be determined by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office or by the courts?60  How should such royalty be calculated?61 
 
 58. Compare Mueller, supra note 50, at 62 (supporting compensation even when the research 
use does not result in a commercial product), with Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 756 (justifying a 
regime where compensation is not given for the mere research use of the original invention). 
 59. For support of such an exemption doctrine, see, for example, Chang, supra note 49, at 42-
49 (arguing that fewer exemptions should be granted when the standalone value of the original 
invention is particularly low or particularly high); Merges & Nelson, supra note 29, at 865-67 
(arguing that an exemption is warranted particularly when the marginal value of the second 
invention is higher than the standalone value of the original invention).  But see Tur-Sinai, supra 
note 20, at 759-60 (arguing that, in light of the potential damage to the original inventor’s incentive 
as a result of such exemption doctrine, its application should be primarily restricted to cases where 
the original inventor could not have reasonably expected the development of the follow-on 
invention).  For a limited exemption doctrine adopted by the U.S. judiciary—the so-called “reverse 
doctrine of equivalents”—see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 770.  
 60. For a suggestion to apply liability rules in a sweeping manner whenever negotiations 
between the inventors fail, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 761.  In practice, even countries that 
have enacted a liability rule in this context in the form of a compulsory license have conditioned it 
upon the follow-on invention involving “an important technical advance of considerable economic 
significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent.”   Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean 
Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 117, 120 (2004).  
This limitation originated in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31(l)(i), Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1210 (1994) [hereinafter “the TRIPS Agreement”], which sets up mandatory 
conditions in this regard.  It should be noted that in the United States, which is known for its general 
hostility towards compulsory licenses in patent law, no such provision has been enacted.  See Tur-
Sinai, supra note 20, at 773. 
 61. For relevant discussions in the literature, see for example Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green 
Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, in EXPANDING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
23, 44 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Mueller, supra note 50, at 64-65; Tur-Sinai, 
supra note 20, at 765-66. 
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Against this background, this Article will now turn to examine the 
potential contribution of integrating non-utilitarian theories into the 
analysis of patent law, in general, and in connection with the search for 
an optimal solution to the perplexing case of cumulative innovation, in 
particular.  
III.  THE LABOR THEORY 
A. General 
One of the principal theories used in support of property rights is 
the labor theory, based on the work of John Locke, who argued that 
every person has a right to the fruits of her labor.62  This is a theory of 
natural law, which views property rights as pre-existing in the state of 
nature.63  According to Locke, God gave the world to men in common,64 
yet “every man has a property [right] in his own person”65 and from 
such right follows also his right to “[t]he Labour of his Body, and the 
Work of his Hands.”66  Therefore, whatever a person has removed out of 
its natural state and mixed her labor therewith belongs to her.67  One 
fundamental condition to the acquisition of property, according to the 
labor theory, is that the resources that labor is mixed with have been 
initially in the “common state,” i.e., in the public domain.68  Beyond 
that, Locke described two main limitations to the scope of property 
rights that a person may acquire in the fruits of her labor69:  (1) “there is 
 
 62. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290-91 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 63. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 19 (Brotherhood eds., 
Jerusalem 1988); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused by 
Planning Authorities: Towards a Comprehensive Theory, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 47, 50 (1996). 
 64. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 286. 
 65. Id. at 287. 
 66. Id. at 287-88.   
 67. Id. at 288. 
 68. Id.  See also Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (2003). 
 69. In addition to these two limitations, it can be argued that the acquisition of property 
should also be limited by the general principle of natural law, pursuant to which one should not 
cause damage to another, other than in certain instances of extreme necessity.  See LOCKE, supra 
note 62, at 271 (“no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions”).  
However, this principle may not be necessary as a separate limitation on the ability to acquire 
property as it seems that Locke took it into account while designing the specific rules governing the 
acquisition of property.  First, the principal rule itself, assigning property rights to the laborer, can 
be justified by the no-harm principle, assuming that taking the fruits of her labor away would cause 
the laborer harm.  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1544-45, 1561 
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enough, and as good left in common for others”;70 and (2) the laborer 
does not waste resources by taking more than she needs for her own use, 
including use by means of exchange with others.71 
As explained above, Locke’s conclusion that a person has a 
property right in the fruits of her labor follows from his argument that a 
person owns a right to her own body, hence to the labor of her body, and 
therefore to anything that results from mixing her labor with common 
resources.72  This may be considered an adequate justification for the 
existence of property rights under the theory.73  However, among those 
who studied and analyzed Locke’s theory, some consider such 
conclusion as warranting a separate justification, which they have looked 
for in other places in Locke’s writings or elsewhere.74  One possible 
justification for recognizing property rights in the fruits of one’s labor is 
that when labor results in something valuable for society then the laborer 
is morally entitled to a just reward in consideration for such value.75  It 
should be noted that if, indeed, the justification for the laborer’s right is 
her contribution to society, then the scope of such right should arguably 
be limited to the added value derived from the labor and should not 
include the original resource that the labor was invested it.76  Another 
 
(1993); Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1185-86.  Second, in order to ensure that no harm is caused to 
others as a result of the grant of property right to the laborer, Locke set the two specific limitations 
discussed in the text.  See, e.g., Gordon, supra, at 1562; Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1185. 
 70. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 288.  This limitation can be interpreted broadly—a requirement 
to leave enough resources from the exact same type and quality—but such interpretation may 
completely negate the possibility to attain rights in objects, at least when it comes to tangibles.  
Therefore, scholars analyzing Locke’s theory tended to interpret this requirement in a narrower 
manner, i.e., as a requirement to leave enough resources of any type that would enable others to 
work and earn sustenance.  See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1187.    
 71. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 290 (“[a]s much as any one can make use of any advantage of 
life before it spoils; so much he may by his Labour fix a Property in.  Whatever is beyond this, is 
more than his share, and belongs to others.  Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or 
destroy”); id. at 295 (“[b]ut if they perished, in his Possession, without their due use; if the Fruits 
rotted, or the Venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common Law of 
Nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his Neighbour’s share, for he had no Right, 
farther than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him Conveniencies of 
Life”); id. at 300 (discussing the possibility of exchange).   
 72. For a description of the labor theory along similar lines, see Damstedt, supra note 68, at 
1181, 1184. 
 73. According to this interpretation of the theory, the justification for private property is based 
on the property right that a person has in her body, which attaches to the product of her labor.  
 74. See, e.g., Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S. 
Patent System, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 561, 579 (2003). 
 75. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 609, 624 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 
305 (1988). See, with respect to the value of labor, infra note 78.   
 76. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 305.  
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reward-type justification is based on the assumption that human beings 
would rather avoid labor and that compensation for the inconvenience of 
the laborer should be given to her in the form of a right in the fruits of 
her labor.77  The above arguments may also serve as a basis for a 
utilitarian interpretation of Locke’s theory.  If people’s natural tendency 
is to avoid labor, then in light of labor’s importance to society,78 human 
beings should be given an incentive to labor, which is what property 
rights are meant to provide.79  An alternative justification for granting a 
property right to the laborer is that a person needs a means of 
sustenance, and as work is the main way of attaining this, there is a need 
to recognize a laborer’s right to the means of sustenance she acquired 
through work.80  Finally, labor theory can be tied to the general 
principles of unjust enrichment, which are based on notions of corrective 
justice because absent protection for the right of a person to exclusively 
enjoy the fruits of her labor, others may be unjustly enriched at her 
expense.81  
The labor theory can be criticized on various grounds.  One critical 
argument that can be made against the theory is that there is a wide gap 
between the theory and the real state of affairs as a result of the theory’s 
focus on merely one mechanism for attaining private property while 
ignoring other mechanisms, such as inheritance.  The economic disparity 
between individuals in society is wide, and there is not necessarily a 
correlation between the amount of work done by each individual and her 
level of wealth.82  A different argument notes that a theory based on an 
 
 77. Id. at 303. 
 78. See, with respect to the importance of labor, LOCKE, supra note 62, at 297.  Locke notes 
that granting property rights to individuals in assets that they created through their labor increases 
the pool of assets that stands to serve society.  Id. at 294.  A possible argument is that if the new 
assets created by labor remain the property of the laborer, then society’s wealth does not increase, 
though Locke emphasizes that such new assets can potentially serve other members of society 
through exchange transactions.  Id. at 300.  For discussion, see also Hughes, supra note 75, at 299. 
 79. For an interpretation of the labor theory along similar lines, see, for example, Hughes, 
supra note 75, at 296; David W. Opderbeck, Symposium: Closing In on Open Science: Trends in 
Intellectual Property & Scientific Research: A Virtue-Centered Approach to the Biotechnology 
Commons (or, the Virtuous Penguin), 59 ME. L. REV. 315, 317 (2007).    
 80. This is implied by Locke himself. See LOCKE, supra note 62, at 288-89; cf. Becker, supra 
note 75, at 626-28 (discussing psychological needs of the laborer “that can appropriately be met by 
the award of property rights”).  
 81. See LOCKE, supra note 62, at 291 (“He that had as good left for his Improvement, as was 
already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by 
another’s Labour: If he did, ’tis plain he desired the benefit of another’s Pains, which he had no 
right to”).  
 82. See DAPHNA LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, INJURIES TO LAND CAUSED BY PLANNING 
AUTHORITIES 63 (1994) (in Hebrew).  
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assumption that labor can be attributed exclusively to a single individual 
is unrealistic, as work in modern day is typically done in teams 
comprised of numerous individuals in an environment that provides the 
laborer with the necessary tools and opportunity to work.  This makes it 
difficult to justify the grant of exclusive rights in an asset to an 
individual based on the argument that such asset is the product of her 
labor.83  A related criticism may be that, inasmuch as the labor theory is 
based on the argument that the laborer is entitled to a reward for her 
contribution to society, the theory cannot justify full property rights in 
assets with a value exceeding such contribution.  Beyond that, one may 
criticize the religious notions underlying the theory, the initial claim that 
a person has a property-like right over her body, and the implicit 
assumptions that the theory is based upon, such as the assumption that 
there is an indefinite amount of resources in the public domain.84  
Finally, it can be argued that, even if the laborer deserves to be rewarded 
for her work, this does not necessarily mean that such reward should be 
in the form of a property right in the fruits of her labor, as it is seemingly 
sufficient to award her money damages, at least according to some of the 
aforementioned justifications to the theory.85  
Ultimately, despite these and other critical arguments, the labor 
theory has become over the years one of the main theories for justifying 
rights in private property.86  Even though the theory originally focused 
on property rights in physical assets,87 it has been used for the 
justification and analysis of intellectual property rights as well.88  
 
 83. See MORRIS R. COHEN, Property and Sovereignty, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 41, 51 
(1933) (noting that “economic goods are never the result of any one man’s unaided labour”). 
 84. If natural resources were limited, then at some point it would become impossible to meet 
the theory’s requirement that enough is left for others.  Cf. Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1181, 1187 
(arguing that if the duty to leave enough to others is interpreted broadly (see supra note 70), the 
theory fails).  This is exactly the reason why some argue that the theory is more applicable to 
intangibles.  See infra note 112 and accompanying text.  
 85. See generally J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 209 (1996) (noting that “[c]laims to 
property based on labour-desert are dependent on social convention”).  
 86. See, e.g., id. at 182-212; STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254-91 (1990); 
WALDRON, supra note 63, at 137-252.  
 87. For an argument that a more thorough examination of Locke’s writings reveals that he 
actually had a solid point of view with respect to rights in intangibles as well, see generally Lior 
Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891 (2006). 
 88. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 75; Hughes, supra note 75; Damstedt, supra note 68; 
Gordon, supra note 69; Zemer, supra note 87; Lim, supra note 74, at 579; Stephen M. McJohn, The 
Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 44 (2000); Caroline Nguyen, Toward an 
Incentivized But Just Intellectual Property Practice: The Compensated IP Proposal, 14 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 119-26 (2004); Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual 
Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence 
Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 832-35 (2000).  See generally Andrew R. Sommer, Trouble on the 
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Although there are various challenges associated with applying the 
theory to intangibles, it is generally agreed that to the extent that it is 
possible to justify property in tangibles based on the labor theory, it is 
also possible to use it for the justification of intellectual property 
rights,89 and in a way, it is even easier to do so.90  When a person creates 
a work of authorship or develops a technological invention, she invests 
her labor in the process,91 and therefore, according to the labor theory, is 
entitled to rights over the product resulting from such process, provided 
only that the conditions for the acquisition of property set forth by Locke 
are met:  there is enough left for others, and there is no waste of 
resources.92  Some scholars who dealt with the application of the labor 
theory to intellectual property rights examined the extent to which 
intellectual property law is consistent with these principles and 
suggested various revisions in the law in order to increase its correlation 
 
Commons: A Lockean Justification for Patent Law Harmonization, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 141 (2005); Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 65 (1997); Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing 
Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 117 (2004); Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A Normative and Positive 
Analysis of the Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281 (1994).  
 89. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 75, at 609-10; Glitzenstein, supra note 88, at 314; Hughes, 
supra note 75, at 297.  A separate examination could be held under each possible justification for 
the labor theory in order to evaluate whether it is justified, pursuant thereto, to grant property rights 
in intangibles.  Thus, for example, if the justification is the added value created by labor (see supra 
notes 75-76 and accompanying text), then—assuming that the intangible products protected by 
intellectual property law are valuable to society—intellectual property rights are justified.  See with 
respect to patent law, Hughes, supra note 75, at 307 (explaining why the current standards used to 
measure patent eligibility are in accordance with an added value justification).  If the justification is 
not the added value created by labor but rather the need of the laborer herself for the fruits of her 
labor (see supra note 80 and accompanying text), it can be argued that the labor theory does not 
apply with respect to intellectual products, as the laborer does not need them as much as she needs 
the physical means of sustenance dealt with directly by Locke.  However, the laborer’s needs can be 
said to include not only the need for means of physical sustenance but also artistic and intellectual 
needs, the need of an individual to express herself, etc.  See Gordon, supra note 69, at 1555.  
Beyond that, it can be argued that property right in intellectual assets is what allows authors of 
copyrightable works and inventors of patentable inventions to earn money and use it to purchase 
whatever they need to sustain themselves physically.  
 90. See infra note 112 and accompanying text, for the proposition that the Lockean proviso 
that “there is enough, and as good left in common for others” can be satisfied more easily with 
respect to intangibles, due to their non-rival nature.  
 91. One question that arises, in this context, is whether intellectual labor is equivalent to the 
physical labor discussed by Locke.  The common answer is yes.  See, e.g., Zemer, supra note 87, at 
911; McJohn, supra note 88, at 44; Hughes, supra note 75, at 301, 304-05 (noting that the large 
scope of activities associated with most research projects nowadays strengthens the conclusion that 
research and development activities can be classified as labor). 
 92. For a discussion of these conditions in connection with intellectual property protection, 
see generally Hughes, supra note 75, at 315-29; Nguyen, supra note 88, at 119-26.   
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with the theory.93  However, the theory has never been accepted by 
scholars or policymakers in the patent arena as a standard tool for the 
evaluation of the patent system, which can supplement and enhance the 
economic analysis in discussions with respect to the optimal design of 
patent law.  In the next section, this potential role of the labor theory will 
be demonstrated in connection with the case of cumulative innovation.  
B. Cumulative Innovation in light of the Labor Theory 
Assuming that the labor theory provides a valid justification for 
granting property rights in technological inventions—i.e., for the patent 
system—then in a cumulative innovation setting, this justification 
clearly supports the grant of a patent for the first invention in a sequence 
of inventions, as it is the fruit of its inventor’s labor.  The interesting 
question, though, is whether the theory can provide some guidance as to 
the scope of such a patent.  According to the theory, the right of a 
laborer applies to all the assets produced by her work, subject only to the 
external limitations on the acquisition of property (the condition that 
enough is left for others and the no-waste prohibition), which will be 
discussed separately below.  Arguably, a follow-on invention should be 
considered to be derived from the original inventor’s labor, at least in 
instances where it would not have been developed otherwise (i.e., when 
the first invention served as a but-for cause in its development 
process).94  A possible conclusion is that property rights over follow-on 
inventions should be allocated to the original inventor.   
Yet, labor theory, as originally crafted, only applies to direct 
products of a person’s labor and does not address a situation where, 
based on such products, another person’s labor leads to entirely different 
products.  As follow-on inventions, by definition, are not the direct 
products of the original inventor’s labor, labor theory does not mandate 
that she owns the patents for such inventions on top of the patent for her 
original invention.  
This conclusion can be further supported by reverting to the various 
explanations outlined above for the justification of the labor theory.  
 
 93. Thus, for example, scholars opined that the labor theory supports adopting an independent 
development defense in patent law.  See infra note 118 and accompanying text.  For a different 
example, see Sommer, supra note 88 (arguing that patent laws around the world should be 
harmonized because only then would the patentee be able to get a full reward for her contribution to 
society, as the labor theory mandates).  
 94. In other instances, the first invention may merely lower the cost of developing the second 
invention or may allow for its more rapid development.  See SCOTCHMER, supra note 35, at 127; 
Scotchmer, supra note 19, at 31.   
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According to the “added value approach,”95 the first inventor is not the 
one who solely produced the social value embodied in a follow-on 
invention, and therefore, she does not deserve a reward for such value in 
the form of a property right in such invention.  However, as she 
contributed to this value,96 she should earn a portion of it, as a reward 
for her contribution.97  According to the “compensation for the 
inconvenience” approach,98 the first inventor is not the one who has 
suffered the inconvenience associated with the labor invested in the 
development of the follow-on invention.  Nevertheless, she may have a 
just claim to a portion of the profits from such invention as 
compensation for the inconvenience associated with the development of 
the original invention, which served as a basis for the follow-on 
invention and, while doing so, presumably lowered the amount of labor 
required to develop it and the associated level of the follow-on 
inventor’s inconvenience associated with her labor.  Under the 
“necessity” approach,99 as a follow-on invention was not developed by 
the original inventor, it cannot be considered to be directly related to her 
effort to secure means of sustenance.  However, it might be the case that, 
in order to allow the original inventor to earn enough money, she should 
be entitled to a portion of the profits in the markets for follow-on 
inventions.100  Finally, under the “unjust enrichment” approach,101 as 
long as the original inventor is compensated for her contribution to the 
development of a follow-on invention, there is no need to grant her a 
patent for such invention in order to avoid unjust enrichment.  In fact, 
such patent would unjustly enrich her at the expense of the follow-on 
inventor. 
 
 95. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
 96. This is not only in cases where the original invention served as a but-for cause in the 
development process of the follow-on invention but also in cases where it merely lowered the cost 
of its development or accelerated it.  Therefore, and due to the difficulty in proving causation, it 
seems that the same principal solution should be applied with respect to all these cases.  
 97. Such conclusion is also supported by the approach according to which a property right 
should be limited to the value added by the laborer.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  The 
value added by the original inventor includes the potential uses of her invention by others as an 
inventive input, and thus, a portion of the value of the resulting follow-on invention, which reflects 
such input, should be attributed to the original inventor’s labor, which must be rewarded 
accordingly.  
 98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 99. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 100. This may be particularly so in connection with research tools or other basic inventions 
which do not have a stand-alone commercial value. 
 101. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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Ultimately, labor theory does not justify the grant of a patent for a 
follow-on invention to the original inventor, though it does call for 
compensating the original inventor for her contribution to the 
development of such invention by allowing her to win a portion of its 
value that would reflect such contribution.102  In order to ensure such 
compensation, the exploitation of follow-on inventions needs to be 
included in the scope of the original patent.103  This conclusion 
correlates to the basic findings of the economic analysis,104 though the 
need to take into account the magnitude of the original invention’s 
contribution to the development of the follow-on invention in calculating 
the compensation due to the original inventor105 is uniquely derived 
from the analysis under the labor theory.106 
As to the patent for the follow-on invention, it should be granted to 
the follow-on inventor, considering that she is the one who actually 
developed it.  This invention is the fruit of her labor and according to all 
the justifications for the labor theory, she is entitled to a property right in 
it.  She deserves a reward for the social value embedded in the 
invention,107 is entitled to compensation for the inconvenience 
associated with her labor, should be able to attain means of sustenance 
through her labor, and should get protection against unjust enrichment.  
Admittedly, the labor theory deals directly only with situations in which 
the labor of one person is invested in common resources,108 while in the 
 
 102. In general, there is no need to interpret Locke’s theory as ruling in a dichotomist manner 
that the only right that a person can have with respect to an object is a complete property right.  See 
also infra note 145 and accompanying text.  
 103. For a proposal, relying on economic analysis of the matter, to adopt an “Absolute Scope 
Principle” in patent law in order to ensure compensation to original inventors in cumulative 
innovation cases, see Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 742-44. 
 104. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 105. Admittedly, determining this parameter may prove difficult.  The inventors themselves 
surely cannot be expected to agree upon it, as each one may have an inflated idea of her own 
contribution or not understand the other’s contribution.  See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 
701 (1998); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of 
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 89-91 (1994); Turner, supra note 25, at 183.  See generally 
Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving 
Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997) (discussing the tendency of parties to arrive at judgments that 
reflect a self-serving bias: to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself). 
 106. Under the economic analysis, the relevant parameters in determining an efficient division 
of profits among the inventors are different, and include most notably the respective costs associated 
with the development of each invention.   See, e.g., Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 750. 
 107. This is also true under the position that property should be limited to the value added by 
the laborer as the patent for the follow-on invention would be limited to the novel elements 
contributed by the follow-on inventor.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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cumulative innovation setting, the follow-on inventor also uses the 
product of someone else’s labor as an input.  However, as explained 
above, it seems that all the underlying justifications for granting a 
property right to the laborer apply with respect to a follow-on inventor as 
well, and thus, allowing her to register a patent for her invention seems 
supported by the theory.109   
As mentioned above, Locke specified two external limitations on 
the ability to acquire property, which will be discussed below.   
1. The Duty to Leave Enough for Others 
A condition for acquiring property, according to Locke, is that 
“there is enough, and as good left in common for others”.110  One may 
prevent others from using her work products only if there would remain 
sufficient resources in the public domain to allow others to labor and 
acquire property as well.111  In theory, it is easier to meet this condition 
when the product is an intangible, in light of the non-rivalry 
characterizing it, i.e., the fact that the use of an intangible by one does 
not prevent simultaneous use of it (or the resources embedded in it) by 
others.112  Yet, this conclusion could only hold if there were no property 
rights in intangibles.113  Once intellectual property protection is in force, 
there is an artificial want of the products covered by it, as others are no 
longer free to use them, even if such use is non-rival by its nature.  
Patent law is specifically designed to prevent competition by free riders, 
and there is essentially no freedom to use an invention covered by a 
 
 109. The difference between the basic setting of labor performed on common resources only, 
discussed by Locke, and the cumulative innovation setting, where the fruits of someone else’s labor 
are used by the current laborer, should be given due account in requiring that a follow-on inventor 
compensates the original inventor, as discussed above.  
 110. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 111. The resources of which a sufficient amount needs to be left for others are the raw 
materials to which labor can be applied (rather than the work products).  See, e.g., Gordon, supra 
note 69, at 1562-64; Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1181; Zemer, supra note 87, at 928. 
 112. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 75, at 315 (pointing out that every idea can be used by an 
unlimited number of individuals).   
 113. Hughes acknowledges the fact that property rights in intangibles may affect the 
possibilities of others, but he maintains that current intellectual property law does not provide 
absolute exclusivity to the owner of the right—inter alia, as third parties cannot be prevented from 
using in their thoughts ideas embedded in patents of others—and hence, it does not unduly limit the 
possibilities of future creators and inventors.  On the contrary, his position is that as soon as a new 
idea has been commercialized and people know about it, it becomes easier for them to create and 
invent.  See id. at 315-16.  This position is problematic, as the ability to think is generally not 
sufficient to provide creators and inventors the freedom to continue being active in their field, in 
contrast to the ability to actually use the protected intellectual products and/or to embody them in 
the new product.  
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patent during the patent term.114  The relevant inquiry is whether, 
considering the exclusive rights provided by a patent, there is still 
enough left for others following the registration of a patent for an 
original invention.  
As the condition that enough is left for others relates to the 
underlying raw materials, i.e., the inventive inputs, it does not seem to 
be affected by the patentee’s right to prevent mere imitators from using 
her invention without permission.115  The requirement that enough be 
left for others is meant to allow others to labor in order to attain property 
and not to grant them permission to use the fruits of the original 
laborer’s efforts.  It seems that with respect to patent law, this limitation 
on the scope of property is particularly relevant to the cumulative 
innovation scenario, where the rights of the patentee need to be balanced 
with the interests of other potential inventors.  
In order to continue the inquiry as to whether sufficient “raw 
materials” are left for the use of other potential inventors once a patent 
for an original invention was registered, such raw materials must be 
defined.  The inventive inputs used in the development process of a new 
invention seem to include:  (1) the pre-existing art, i.e., the information 
existing in the world pertaining to the subject matter of the invention116 
and (2) a pool of raw ideas that have not yet been revealed by anyone.117   
Arguably, when a person registers a patent, the pre-existing art 
underlying her invention still remains available to be used by anyone, 
and following the patent term, it is even expected to be widened by the 
information embedded in the new patent.  The raw idea underlying the 
invention is arguably taken by the inventor, though as she was actually 
the one drawing it out of “darkness,” it was not exactly withdrawn from 
the public domain, and in any case, it can be reasonably assumed that 
there are sufficient other raw ideas in the same imaginary pool waiting to 
be revealed by others.  Yet, these arguments seem to ignore the dynamic 
 
 114. This is subject, of course, to certain limited exceptions, including an experimental use 
exception, to the extent it exists in various legal systems.  
 115. Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1576 (focusing on copyright law and suggesting that the 
creator could bar a commercial user “who has been drawn to the work solely in order to save 
himself fungible resources such as money, effort, and time”).   
 116. It should be noted that the term “pre-existing art” used herein, which encompasses every 
piece of information pre-existing in the world that may be used by the inventor, is not equivalent to 
the more limited technical term “prior art,” which is used in connection with the examination of the 
novelty and non-obviousness requirements in patent law.   
 117. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1192-93.  For the notion that ideas are pre-existing in an 
imaginary repository, see also Hughes, supra note 75, at 312 (discussing the view that new ideas are 
“plucked from some platonic common”). 
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nature of technology development, as will be explained below, first with 
respect to the pre-existing art and thereafter with respect to the raw ideas 
pool.  
As for the pre-existing art, following the development of a new 
invention and the registration of a patent for it, even though the 
information which the inventor relied upon remains in the public 
domain, the inventive uses that can be made with it are no longer the 
same, and therefore, it is not clear at all that under the current design of 
patent law a sufficient opportunity to invent is left for others.  First, due 
to the “winner-take-all” characteristic of the patent system, under which 
a patentee can prevent even someone who independently developed the 
same invention from using it, the underlying information clearly can no 
longer be used for the same purpose for which it was used by the 
original inventor (i.e., to develop the exact same invention).118   
Moreover, following the registration of a patent, it may even be 
difficult to develop other patent-eligible inventions based on the same 
information underlying the original invention.  Let us consider the 
following scenario:  Inventor A has just registered a patent for a cellular 
phone antenna and inventor B wishes to develop a different antenna 
based on the same prior art.  This may not be feasible.  The number of 
different inventions that can be made using the same inventive inputs is 
presumably limited, at least in some contexts.  In addition, even if the 
same pre-existing art could lead inventor B to a different type of 
antenna, such new antenna may not be eligible for patent protection.  To 
be eligible for a patent, an invention must be held novel and non-obvious 
against the prior art, which now includes, inter alia, the information 
embedded in the patent just registered by inventor A.  Depending on the 
differences between the antennas, the new one may not be considered 
novel and non-obvious.  The forefront of scientific research and 
technological development keeps moving on, and this is reflected in the 
continuously evolving composition of the prior art used by patent 
 
 118. It can be argued, then, that in order to satisfy the requirement that enough is left for others 
(particularly in its broad interpretation—see supra note 70), this fundamental patent law principle 
should be abandoned.  Cf. Becker, supra note 75, at 629 (noting that whoever independently 
developed the invention labored as well and therefore is entitled to a property right exactly like the 
original inventor); Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1186 (recommending to adopt an independent 
development defense against infringement based on Locke’s theory); Moore, supra note 88, at 100 
(emphasizing the need to not make the situation of the second inventor worse compared to his 
situation before the registration of the patent by the original inventor).  It should be noted, however, 
that, even if we allow independent development, after the registration of a patent for the original 
invention and the public disclosure of the relevant information, the chance that other potential 
inventors in the same field will not be exposed to it (and are also able to prove it) is small.  
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examiners to evaluate patent applications.  For these reasons, following 
the registration of a patent, the opportunity of others to use the same pre-
existing art underlying it as the basis for further novel and non-obvious 
inventions is narrowed down.  In order to increase the chances of future 
inventors to develop patentable inventions, it seems that they should be 
allowed to use or even incorporate previously patented inventions in 
their projects.  In the example used above, such policy would allow 
inventor B to work on an improvement of inventor A’s antenna, rather 
than a mere version for such antenna developed based on the same pre-
existing art.  
Moreover, a new invention often changes the scientific and 
technological landscape, and by doing so, it affects opportunities for 
research and development by future inventors.119  For example, a new 
patented laboratory research tool in the biotechnology field may be 
radically more efficient and achieve far better results than previous 
technologies used for that purpose.  If this is the case, then inventors 
forced to continue using such old technologies may quickly find 
themselves out of the game.  This effect may be even stronger when the 
original invention is a pioneer invention, which can potentially serve as 
the basis for multiple applications in a variety of technological fields, or 
when it becomes a standard in the relevant industry.120 
For all these reasons, it seems fair to say that, at least in some 
instances, an inventor who registers a patent for her invention attaches 
her property right, indirectly, to the underlying materials as well, and 
thus, withdraws them from the public domain in terms of the practical 
ability to reuse them for the purpose of developing other patentable 
inventions.  An argument can be made that while the inventor detracts 
something from the public domain, she also enriches it by disclosing the 
details of her invention in a manner that will allow the public to use it at 
the end of the patent term.121  Yet, timing matters.  Technologies become 
obsolete rapidly, and at the end of the patent term, the ability to use the 
invention as the basis for the development of follow-on inventions may 
not be relevant anymore.  Beyond that, as the issue at stake is an 
 
 119. A new invention may also cause a shift in consumer preferences, which then influences 
the demand for certain follow-on inventions.  Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1567-70 (discussing the 
effect of a new intellectual product on the “stream of culture and events”).   
 120. Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1600 (pointing out that giving ownership in a work that has 
come to serve as standard may not leave enough opportunities for others).  
 121. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (setting forth the requirement that as part of the patent 
application, a written description of the invention shall be made, “in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same”).  
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opportunity to work and acquire property, having “enough for others” in 
twenty years cannot be considered satisfactory.  Thus, in order to 
provide other inventors with a real opportunity to engage in research and 
development and to attain property rights in inventions, it seems that 
they should be allowed to use the information located at the forefront of 
the relevant technological field immediately—i.e., not only the public 
domain information underlying the original invention but the proprietary 
information embedded in it as well.   
As for the raw idea at the basis of the invention, the more we treat it 
as if it was drawn out of a pool that was originally free for use by every 
member of society,122 the more it can be said that when registering a 
patent for her invention, the inventor impoverished the public domain by 
depleting it of something that others might have discovered more or less 
at the same time.123  In any case, the question is whether, once the 
inventor acquired property rights over her idea, there are enough such 
ideas left for others.  Even under an assumption that the amount of ideas 
in such imaginary pool is infinite,124 human history tells that such ideas 
are bound to be revealed in a gradual manner, depending, inter alia, on 
the state of knowledge at the relevant time.  At any given period there 
are, on a practical level, only a limited number of potential paths for 
research and development.125  Therefore, once the original inventor 
secured her exclusivity in her invention, she may have narrowed down 
the current possibilities available for others.  This conclusion is even 
stronger when the inquiry is narrowed down to the specific technological 
field at stake.126   
A possible counterargument is that, as a patentable invention 
pushes forward the forefront of technological research and opens up new 
 
 122. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 123. As to the likelihood that someone else would discover the same patented invention, see 
Moore, supra note 88, at 103; Jackson, supra note 88, at 127.  What increases the likelihood of this 
occurring is the fact that an invention is often a solution to a current need.     
 124. This is a philosophical question without any clear answer.  See, e.g., Damstedt, supra note 
68, at 1191 n.57.  
 125. Cf. Nguyen, supra note 88, at 122 (noting that “while ideas are technically limitless, the 
realm of useful and worthwhile ideas is much more focused and accessible only to those who have 
access to previous intellectual products”); PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 51 (1995) (pointing out that “[e]ven where the stock of abstract objects is infinite, the 
human capacity to exploit that stock at any given moment is conditioned by the state of cultural and 
scientific knowledge which exists at that historical moment”). 
 126. This is related to the way this Lockean proviso is interpreted in general.  See supra note 
70.  In the specific context dealt with herein, the question is whether it is enough that a general 
opportunity to work (or invent) is left open or whether it is specifically required that an opportunity 
to develop further inventions in the same technological field remain open.   
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avenues for further development, it can increase the chances that future 
inventors will be able to pull new ideas from the common pool.127  
However, this is generally true only insomuch as uses of the patented 
invention by follow-on inventors are permitted.128  A breakthrough 
invention in the field of nanotechnology does not broaden research and 
development opportunities in the field, unless other inventors are 
allowed to use it, improve upon it, or incorporate it in their own 
invention.  In other words, in order to be able to reveal the next-in-turn 
idea, which is situated deeper in the “pool,” the current inventor must be 
allowed to “stand on the shoulders” of her predecessor.129  This 
conclusion is derived directly from the cumulative nature of scientific 
research and technological development.  If an inventor who registers a 
patent for an original invention is allowed control over the entire 
“prospect”130 marked by her invention and if other inventors are not 
allowed to use the patented invention for the purpose of developing 
follow-on inventions, then such other inventors’ opportunity to engage 
in research and development is narrowed down, and thus again, not 
enough is left for others.131   
To summarize, the development of a new invention and the 
registration of a patent for it may affect opportunities to engage in 
research and development.  In many cases, in order to allow inventors a 
real opportunity to participate in the game, they should be allowed to 
make use of prior inventions.  The first Lockean proviso for the 
acquisition of property, thus, supports the adoption of an experimental 
use exception in patent law.132   
2. The No Waste Prohibition  
As mentioned earlier, the second Lockean condition for the 
acquisition of property is that there is no waste of work products.  
Scholars analyzing the labor theory have suggested a few possible 
 
 127. Cf. Hughes, supra note 75, at 316; Sommer, supra note 88, at 159. 
 128. Cf. supra note 113 and accompanying text.  
 129. See supra note 19, for Newton’s famous quote. 
 130. See, with respect to the “prospect” theory, supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
 131. Cf. Jackson, supra note 88, at 135 (noting that “even if the commons is not affected by 
removing from it the information found in the patent, the state of the art that lies just beyond the 
patent itself cannot be explored without fear that the pioneer will refuse to grant a license”). 
 132. The arguments leading to this conclusion seem to apply, in equal force, to all scenarios of 
cumulative innovation, including the research tools scenario.  Cf. supra note 57 and accompanying 
text (describing various approaches taken by scholars analyzing the question of how wide the 
experimental use exception should be from an economic perspective).   
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/5
10-TUR-SINAI_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:57 AM 
2012] BEYOND INCENTIVES 271 
explanations for the rationale behind the no waste prohibition133:  (1) 
there might be a shortage as a result of the waste of products; (2) labor 
itself would be wasted without bringing any benefit to the laborer; and 
(3) “[n]othing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”134 
While this prohibition may not be significant in connection with 
tangible objects,135 it can be very important in connection with 
intellectual property in light of the non-rival nature of intangibles.136  An 
intellectual product can serve as the basis for numerous tangible copies 
embedding it137 so that an unlimited number of individuals can use it 
simultaneously.  Accordingly, waste seemingly occurs every time a 
certain potential use of an intellectual product that could have brought 
benefit to the user does not materialize such that the social value of the 
product is not fully realized.138  
This means that the no waste prohibition is relevant not only with 
respect to the relationship of the intellectual property owner with future 
inventors and creators (as the previous Lockean proviso)139 but also with 
respect to her relationship with potential end users of the product.  For 
example, if a person developing a certain invention refuses to 
commercialize it, she is arguably wasting it because there are users that 
could have benefitted from using it.  Waste also occurs when a person 
sells the product at such a high price that its potential consumers cannot 
purchase it.140   
 
 133. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 327-39; Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1193-94.   
 134. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 290. 
 135. This is in light of the fact that Locke acknowledges the legitimacy of exchange so it is 
possible to avoid wasting an asset not only by privately using it but also by selling it.  See supra 
note 71 and accompanying text. 
 136. See text accompanying supra note 21. 
 137. When the invention is a process invention, as opposed to a product invention, there is not 
even a need for duplicating a physical artifact.  
 138. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1196-97; Nguyen, supra note 88, at 121.  
 139. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 140. This is the principal argument of Damstedt, supra note 68, who maintains that a refusal to 
sell units of an intangible violates the no waste prohibition and that such violation should lead to the 
deprivation of a property right with respect to such units.  Hence, his conclusion is that pricing an 
intangible at a price higher than zero creates a right of fair use to all the ones evaluating the asset at 
a price higher than zero but lower than the price set by the laborer.  According to his approach, the 
laborer has no right to prevent individuals from using units of the product that are not already being 
used by others.  See supra note 68, at 1201-02.  Damstedt emphasizes that a fair use right of this 
type is much wider than the fair use doctrine currently in force under copyright law in various legal 
systems (id. at 1215), while in patent law there is no such doctrine at all (Damstedt, supra note 68, 
at 1183).  This broad argument is outside the scope of the discussion.  It should be noted, though, 
that there seems to be a great difficulty in receiving reliable information from potential users about 
the value of the product for them, considering that they would be able to enjoy free use of it if they 
declared a value lower than the price set for the product.  See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1201 n.91.  
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In the cumulative innovation context, it seems that the no waste 
prohibition strengthens the conclusion that the use of a patented 
invention for research and development purposes should be allowed 
even without the patentee’s consent, otherwise, there shall be waste.141  
Furthermore, even after the development of a follow-on invention, legal 
intervention may still be warranted under the no waste prohibition if a 
license to commercialize such invention cannot be secured voluntarily 
from the original inventor.142  In such case, the potential waste would 
relate to uses of the follow-on invention rather than uses of the original 
invention.  One position taken in the literature dealing with labor theory 
states that waste should result in a complete loss of the property right 
with respect to the wasted portion.143  The application of this position, in 
the context discussed herein, would supposedly lead to a rule allowing a 
follow-on inventor, who has not received permission from the original 
inventor to commercialize her invention, to nevertheless do so free of 
charge.144  Yet, this is an extreme position not mandated by the labor 
theory.145  If it is possible to find a less extreme way, in terms of its 
effects on the interests of the original inventor, to avoid the potential 
waste resulting from the lack of agreement between the inventors with 
respect to the commercialization of the follow-on invention, it is 
preferable.  And indeed, it is possible to adopt liability rule doctrines that 
would allow the follow-on inventor to commercialize her invention in 
return for an appropriate royalty payable to the original inventor.146  
Such royalty would minimize the damage to the original inventor's 
interests.  
 
Beyond that, it is not necessarily true that waste should result in a complete loss of the property 
right.  See infra note 145 and accompanying text.   
 141. The original patentee herself cannot be expected to develop on her own all potential 
follow-on inventions, as she may lack the requisite incentive and ability to do so.  See Tur-Sinai, 
supra note 20, at 734-35.  
 142. Clearly, such license would only be required when commercialization of the follow-on 
invention is considered within the scope of the original patent.  This would be the case if an 
“Absolute Scope Principle” in patent law is embraced.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
 143. See Damstedt, supra note 68, at 1182, 1214.  As a result, Damstedt argues, as explained 
above, that a broad fair use right should be acknowledged in intellectual property law.  See supra 
note 140. 
 144. According to this position, then, a complete exemption should be granted to follow-on 
inventors.  Cf. supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the relevant discussion under the 
economic theory). 
 145. Cf. Gordon, supra note 69, at 1538 (noting, with respect to the first Lockean proviso, that 
it “can yield outcomes other than the elimination of all claims by the laborer”).  
 146. Cf. supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the relevant discussion under the 
economic theory).   
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3. Summary  
The analysis of cumulative innovation under labor theory leads to 
the following conclusions.  With respect to the development stage, the 
labor theory supports the adoption of a wide experimental use exception, 
ensuring freedom to engage in follow-on research and development in a 
variety of circumstances.147  Following the development of a follow-on 
invention, the theory supports allowing the inventor to register a patent 
for it.  The original inventor should be allowed to earn a portion of the 
profits from follow-on inventions, in light of her contribution to their 
development.  Therefore, the commercial exploitation of follow-on 
inventions should be considered within the scope of the original patent.  
Where the inventors cannot reach a voluntary agreement with respect to 
the exploitation of the follow-on invention, the labor theory supports the 
application of liability rule doctrines (rather than an exemption doctrine), 
allowing non-consented exploitation in return for a reasonable royalty.  
The division of profits among the inventors, in cases where it is not 
agreed upon between them, should reflect as much as possible their 
respective contributions to the development of the follow-on invention.  
Notably, this last conclusion is uniquely based on the analysis under the 
labor theory.148   
The fact that the analysis under the labor theory results in the 
foregoing conclusions may surprise those who believe that natural rights 
theories necessarily support the strengthening of property rights.  Such 
theories, as a general matter, also take into account the interests of the 
public.149  Beyond that, in the particular situation at hand, as there is 
more than one property owner, the conclusions reflect the special need 
for a balancing solution.   
 
 147. For a comparison of this conclusion with the results of the economic analysis, see supra 
note 132. 
 148. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 149. Cf. Lim, supra note 74, at 563 (examining potential application of classical theories of 
natural law to patent law and noting that an approach based on natural law would try to achieve a 
balance between acknowledging the rights of the inventor and her duties to the community).  
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IV.  THE PERSONALITY THEORY 
A. General  
Another theory that is often used to justify property rights is 
Hegel’s personality theory,150 as refined by Professor Radin.151  
According to the personality theory, private property is necessary as a 
means for developing and realizing one’s personality.  Pursuant to 
Hegel, a person cannot begin to realize her self-identity until she is given 
an opportunity to exercise her will on external objects in her 
surroundings.152  In order for a person to enjoy freedom of action with 
respect to assets and a sense of security with respect to the continuity of 
her relationship with them, and in order for her to be able to uniquely 
identify herself based on her relationship with such assets, she should be 
provided a certain level of control over the assets, which is the reason 
that the institution of private property is necessary.153  
A direct conclusion of these basic insights is that every person 
should be provided a threshold amount of property that would enable her 
to function as a free individual and develop her personality.  Yet, 
Professor Radin has gone a step further in her attempt to use the 
personality theory as the basis for detailed recommendations with 
respect to the appropriate design of property protection.  According to 
Radin, a distinction should be made between various types of objects 
based on how closely they are bound up with personhood.  At one end of 
the spectrum, there are certain objects that are often part of the way 
human beings constitute themselves as continuing personal entities in 
the world (“personal property”)—a wedding ring, a portrait, an 
heirloom, or a house.  At the other end of the spectrum, there are objects 
held for purely instrumental reasons (“fungible property”)—money, a 
share certificate, an automobile in the hands of a dealer, or an 
 
 150. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S.W. Dyde trans., Prometheus Books ed. 1996) 
(1821). 
 151. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
[hereinafter Radin, Personhood].  See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1849 (1987).  For a recent criticism of Radin’s version of the personality theory, see Jeanne 
L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453 (2006) 
(claiming that Radin’s version is too remote from the original Hegelian theory to be considered 
derived from it).  For Radin’s treatment of the differences between her thesis and Hegel’s theory, 
see Radin, Personhood, at 977-78. 
 152. HEGEL, supra note 150, at 51-52. 
 153. Id.  See also Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 957, 972-73; Lim, supra note 74, at 
579; Hughes, supra note 75, at 330; Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and 
the Sin of Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 934, 948 (2007). 
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undeveloped tract of land in the hands of a contractor.154  An indicator of 
an object being “personal” is that its loss cannot be compensated through 
payment or replacement with another object of a similar market value 
due to its unique value to its owner; whereas, a “fungible” object, by 
definition, is perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market 
value.155  Radin does not focus on the development process of an object 
but rather on the relationship formed between the object and whoever 
holds it.  Accordingly, the same object can be considered personal or 
fungible, depending on the identity of its current holder.156  Radin 
acknowledges that in certain cases, a person’s attachment to an object 
may not be vital to her healthy self-constitution but rather fetishistic in 
its nature.  In such cases, she maintains that the object should not be 
classified as personal property.157   
Radin’s basic argument, on the normative level, is that legal rules 
should be designed with sensitivity to the abovementioned distinction.  
In general, the more a relationship to an object is located toward the 
personal end of the continuum, the more the entitlement should be 
protected.158  Radin suggests that, at least in certain cases, interests in 
personal property should be protected against invasion by the 
government and against cancellation by conflicting fungible property 
claims of other people by property rules, as no compensation for their 
taking could be just.159  On the contrary, where an entitlement is 
fungible, its protection by liability rules would generally be sufficient, 
while sometimes it may even be justified to allow the taking of fungible 
property without any compensation at all.160  Radin also maintains that 
 
 154. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 959-60. 
 155. For a description of Radin’s insight with respect to the distinction between personal 
objects and fungible objects as part of a broader phenomenon, the existence of a gap between the 
price in which the holder of an object is willing to sell it and the price which buyers are willing to 
pay for the same object in the market, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of 
Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 568 (2005).  The gap might be due to sentimental causes as 
Radin points out, but it might also be caused by a variety of other reasons, some rational and others 
affected by cognitive biases, such as the “endowment effect”.  Id. 
 156. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 987.  See also Steven Cherensky, A Penny for 
Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and 
Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595, 645 (1993).  
 157. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 968-70.  The judgment that a certain relationship 
between a person and an object is non-healthy should be based, according to Radin, on an objective 
moral consensus. Id.  For an argument that this may result in conservatism and in perpetuation of 
the status quo, see Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of 
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 355, 361, 404 (1993). 
 158. Radin, Personhood, supra note 151, at 986. 
 159. Id. at 988, 1005, 1014-15. 
 160. Id. 
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in case of a conflict between fungible property rights and non-property 
interests in personhood, such as free speech rights, it would sometimes 
be appropriate to allow the latter interests to take precedence.161  
Radin’s personality theory has been criticized from various angles.  
One argument is that there is no basis for Radin’s thesis in Hegel’s work, 
where property plays a very formal role—it allows people to create legal 
relationships with each other and thus turn from abstract entities into 
individuals with a concrete existence.162  A different criticism of Radin 
turns against the sweeping classification of objects used for business 
purposes as fungible property, implied from her writing.  An individual 
may spend most of her time in the business, upon which her current 
welfare and future plans are dependent.  Sometimes it is exactly through 
the business that an individual realizes her personal talents and 
qualities.163  Radin’s theory can also be criticized for necessitating 
classifications and tests in order to assess the level of existence of a 
personhood interest in individual cases.164  Radin’s normative 
conclusions can be criticized as well.  For example, even if protection of 
fungible property through liability rules (as opposed to property rules) 
can be justified, it is not clear why it is justified to weaken protection for 
such property even more by allowing for its non-compensated taking in 
certain cases.165    
 
 161. Id. at 1008-13. 
 162. Schroeder, supra note 151, at 454-55, 464, 466-69, 473, 476.  Schroeder emphasizes that 
the analysis of property by Hegel does not address all aspects of personality but only addresses the 
formal role described above.  Therefore, Hegel’s theory can be used in support of a proposition 
whereby a modern state should establish a minimal level of private property, allowing the formation 
of legal relationships between individuals.  However, it does not flow from the theory that society 
has to respect this or another type of property or has to provide a certain degree of protection to a 
certain group of assets, and the theory certainly does not provide any concrete guidance on whether 
any property (or intellectual property) doctrine is appropriate or not. 
 163. See LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, supra note 82, at 79.  See also Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the 
World Trade Center: An Argument for the Applicability of Personhood Theory to Commercial 
Property Ownership and Use, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 815, 815-16, 818-19, 821 (2005) (noting that 
ownership and use of commercial property may have a significant impact on self-identity of 
individuals and criticizing Radin for failing to take it into account).  
 164. For an argument that Radin’s analysis complicated the notion of property, see generally 
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 155, at 551 (pointing out that property, under Radin’s analysis, 
can no longer be treated as a generic relationship between people with respect to objects because her 
analysis demands an inquiry as to the type of object at stake and as to the role that such object plays 
in the development of the personality of the individual claiming rights in it); Hughes, supra note 75, 
at 339 (arguing that a property system protecting personality would encounter difficulties in finding 
reliable indicators with respect to the question of whether people have a personality interest in 
specific objects or not).  
 165. See LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, supra note 82, at 78-79. 
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B. Technological Innovation and the Personality Theory 
The personality theory has been used, not infrequently, in scholarly 
discussions of intellectual property law in general and copyright law in 
particular.166  The common position in the literature is that intellectual 
products are closer to the personal end of Radin’s continuum of objects.  
Such assets are not only held by an individual but are also her creation, 
and thus, reflect her personality.  As a result, the personal bond between 
the individual and such assets is particularly strong.167  Accordingly, 
various scholars used the personality theory in support of arguments 
calling for the strengthening of authors’ rights and, in particular, her 
moral rights, including the right of attribution and the right of 
integrity.168  It should be noted that this approach, according to which a 
personhood interest—justifying an increased level of protection—can 
result from the fact that an object was created by someone whose 
personality is embedded in it,169 deviates from Radin’s version of the 
personality theory, which focuses on the attachment created between an 
object and its holder, while attributing no significance to the 
development process of the object.170   
 
 166. See generally Becker, supra note 75; Amie N. Broder, Comparing Apples to APPLs: 
Importing the Doctrine of Adverse Possession in Real Property to Patent Law, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 557, 573 (2007); Cherensky, supra note 156; Glitzenstein, supra note 88, at 319-22; 
Hoffstadt, supra note 153; Hughes, supra note 75; Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists 
and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998); Lim, supra note 
74; McJohn, supra note 88, at 45; Nguyen, supra note 88, at 126-30; Opderbeck, supra note 79. 
 167. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 330, 365; Becker, supra note 75, at 610; Hoffstadt, supra 
note 153, at 935; McJohn, supra note 88, at 45; Opderbeck, supra note 79, at 319.  
 168. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 166, at 165 (as to the right of attribution); Edward J. 
Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of 
Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (as to the right of integrity; though not explicitly mentioning 
the personality theory as such, the article’s thesis is grounded in the notion that artistic works reflect 
the creative personalities of their authors).  
 169. For a discussion of various personality aspects that may come into effect in the process of 
creating an intellectual product, see Hughes, supra note 166, at 82.  
 170. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  This approach is certainly remote from 
Hegel’s original theory.  See supra note 162 for Schroeder’s position that Hegel’s theory does not 
mandate recognition of specific rights in assets.  Schroeder specifically points out that Hegel’s 
theory cannot be legitimately used to justify moral rights or other increased rights with respect to 
intellectual property.  According to her, any other interpretation, representing a romantic conception 
of personality, would be completely rejected by Hegel.  Works of authorship should be considered 
external to personality just like any other object of property.  See Schroeder, supra note 151, at 457, 
498-99.  Interestingly, the approach described in the text has early roots in the writings of Kant and 
Fichte, who viewed literary works as external expressions of their authors’ personalities.  See 
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Seemingly such an approach, which relies on the great extent to 
which an intellectual product reflects the personality of its creator, is less 
applicable with respect to technological inventions, the subject matter of 
patent protection, than with respect to creative works of authorship, the 
subject matter of copyright protection.  While searching for a 
technological solution for a given problem, e.g., a cure for a certain 
disease, an inventor is guided by the existing knowledge in the relevant 
field and is limited by various constraints—scientific, technological and 
commercial—and thus, has much less room to express her personality.171  
The fact that inventions are often being conceived simultaneously by 
various individuals172 also suggests that technological properties do not 
necessarily reflect the personality of their creators but rather some more 
generic notions.  Nevertheless, it seems that there is still an opportunity 
for an inventor to express her unique personality in a new invention, if 
only the more subtle aspects of her personality, observable perhaps by 
professionals in the relevant field.173  For example, it may be possible, 
within the efficiency constraints faced by computer hardware engineers, 
to design a specific hardware device in various ways, each one 
representing a different personal style for accomplishing the task.174  
Moreover, the argument that an inventor cannot bring her unique 
personality into effect in her work seems to be based on a very narrow 
construction of the notion of personality.  Even if it is true that in the 
development process of an invention there is generally no room for 
nuances reflecting the inventor’s emotional composition or her aesthetic 
preferences as might commonly be the case in artistic works, a 
technological invention is still a unique intellectual product where the 
inventor’s education, intellectual skills, professional experience, vision, 
and imagination all come into play.175  At the same time, it should be 
noted that not all copyright-protected works strongly reflect the 
personality of their authors.  Copyright law protects, inter alia, certain 
 
 171. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 341 (noting, for example, that “[i]n inventing the light bulb, 
Edison searched for the filament material that would burn the longest, not a filament that would 
reflect his personality”).  See also Lim, supra note 74, at 579 (pointing out that inventions are 
generally a solution to a specific problem and not a reflection of the personality of an individual).   
 172. See supra note 123.   
 173. See generally Lim, supra note 74, at 580; Hughes, supra note 75, at 342-43; Cherensky, 
supra note 156, at 649-52. 
 174. Cf. Lim, supra note 74, at 580.   
 175. Cf. Cherensky, supra note 156, at 598 (noting that the interest of the employee in an 
intellectual product developed by her may be based on investment of personal capital: “training and 
education, personality, individual genius, extraordinary effort, creative spark, and even divine 
revelation”).  
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“works of low authorship, such as maps, nautical charts, and factual 
compilations,”176 the content of which is dictated to a large extent by 
their practical purpose.  Copyright protection also applies with respect to 
an important class of technological works, i.e., computer software.  In 
fact, even in the more traditional categories of artistic works, creative 
authorship is subject to certain constraints that limit one’s freedom to 
artistically express herself.  For example, in the creation of a movie, due 
consideration must be given to the expected attention span of the 
audience, to the budget constraints, and to the characteristics of the 
relevant genre.177  To summarize, even if there is some difference 
between technological inventions and copyright-protected works with 
respect to the possibility of expressing one’s personality in the product, 
it is not a vast difference.  It seems that at least in certain cases there 
may be a personhood interest in a technological invention, resulting 
from the fact that the product reflects the personality of the individual 
who developed it.178 
Moreover, it seems that a personality bond in the original sense 
discussed by Radin—i.e., a bond created between the object and its 
holder, regardless of the development process of the object,179 may exist 
as well with respect to technological inventions.  Indeed, in contrast to a 
wedding ring or a family portrait, which is closely guarded by its owner, 
technological inventions are often not only used by their owners in the 
business sphere of their lives (as opposed to the private sphere),180 but 
are also commercialized by them.  Arguably, if a person commercializes 
an object, she cannot have a personality interest in it.  However, 
intellectual products are non-rival by their nature, so the owner of an 
invention can commercialize it (i.e., sell physical embodiments of it 
and/or grant licenses to use it) without abandoning her ownership of 
it.181  One of the basic principles of intellectual property law is the 
 
 176. Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene 
Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 184 (2007). 
 177. See generally Michal Shur-Ofry, The (Copyright) Law of Genre: A Network Perspective 
on Copyright Protection of Cultural Genres, 2 FLA. ENT. L. REV. 60 (2008) (noting the important 
role of genres in various artistic and cultural fields).   
 178. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 143-44 (pointing out that, even if there is no personal 
expression in an invention, a personal intention is invested in its creation, and therefore, the 
personality of the inventor is uniquely reflected in it). 
 179. See supra note 156.  
 180. But see supra note 163 and accompanying text (criticizing this distinction).  
 181. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 86; Opderbeck, supra note 79, at 319.  Clearly, when it 
comes to a complete assignment of intellectual property rights, the personality theory runs into a 
paradox.  The transfer indicates that the individual no longer has a personality interest in the 
product, so the justification for allowing her to dictate the terms of the transfer is unclear.  See 
37
Tur-Sinai: Beyond Incentives
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
10-TUR-SINAI_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:57 AM 
280 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:243 
separation between the intellectual work itself and its physical 
embodiments; the sale of a physical artifact that embodies a protected 
intellectual product is not equivalent to a transfer of ownership in such 
underlying intellectual product.  The commercialization of intellectual 
property (except when an exclusive license is granted) does not damage 
the ability of its owner to keep on using it on her own,182 or even, to 
continue commercializing it.  Therefore, the fact that technological 
inventions are often commercialized by their owners does not 
necessarily place them at the fungible end of Radin’s continuum of 
objects.  In fact, commercialization of an intellectual product may 
contribute to the development of its owner’s personality.  By 
commercializing an intellectual product, the inventor or author reveals 
herself to other individuals, and the payment she receives for the 
opportunity to use her product constitutes an act of recognition of her by 
such individuals.183     
In fact, the personality interest in technological inventions may be 
particularly strong.  An inventor is often identified with her inventions—
Thomas Edison is recognized first and foremost as the inventor of the 
light bulb—and such inventions become the basis for her business and 
commercial activity, i.e., for her connections with other individuals 
through which she defines herself.  Based on the commercial activity 
involving her inventions, the inventor acquires recognition, respect, and 
appreciation by others.  The invention becomes part of the public 
persona of the inventor.184  The fact that the inventor is the one who 
developed the invention surely plays an important role in the formation 
of others’ evaluation of her, especially when it comes to the relevant 
research community.185  Yet, it is possible that even an owner by 
assignment of an invention would develop, as time goes by, a 
personality interest in it, as a result of her business and commercial uses 
of it, while the public learns to recognize her as a unique subject—the 
 
Hughes, supra note 75, at 346-47.  But see Schroeder, supra note 151, at 484 (noting that there is no 
contradiction between the ability to transfer an asset and owning a personality interest in such asset, 
in the original meaning discussed by Hegel). 
 182. This is in contrast to the case of a physical object, which from the moment of its sale or 
lease can no longer be used by its owner (in the case of a lease, for a temporary period, and in the 
case of a sale, indefinitely).   
 183. See Hughes, supra note 75, at 349-51.  Hughes adds that the money earned as a result of 
the commercialization of the asset encourages the creation of further works which reflect the 
personality of their creator.  Id. 
 184. Cf. Hughes, supra note 75, at 343.  For the status attached to success in technological 
development, see, for example, McJohn, supra note 88, at 42; Broder, supra note 166, at 573 n.59.  
 185. Interestingly, it is a prevalent practice among scientists and engineers to list patent 
applications in their resumes.   
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owner of said invention.  The identification with an invention may be 
strong in comparison with the identification with other types of business 
assets in light of the inherent uniqueness of an invention.186 
All in all, it seems that in many cases a personhood interest may 
develop with respect to a technological invention.  The personality 
theory thus provides an additional justification for the exclusive rights 
granted to an inventor under the patent system.  Absent exclusivity, the 
inventor’s competitors may freely use her invention.  This would 
diminish her ability to uniquely identify herself with the invention and 
enjoy adequate recognition by others.  
This, though, is only true with respect to the relationship between 
the inventor and free riders seeking to imitate her invention and use it 
free of charge.  In the special context of cumulative innovation, where 
other researchers and inventors may also have a personality interest 
worthy of protection, the situation may become more complicated as 
will be explored next.   
C. Cumulative Innovation in light of the Personality Theory 
Entrusting control over research uses of an invention in the hands 
of the inventor would deny other potential inventors an opportunity to 
develop follow-on inventions based on such invention, narrowing their 
opportunities to engage in research and development activity and 
lowering their chances of expressing their personality through such 
activity.  Thus, in the cumulative innovation scenario, there is seemingly 
a conflict between the personality interest of one individual and the 
opportunity of other individuals to develop their own personality 
interests.187  In order to allow potential inventors a real chance to 
develop inventions in which they may hold a personhood interest in the 
future and given that technology often develops in a cumulative manner, 
it seems that inventors should be allowed to use patented inventions 
developed by their predecessors in the course of their own research and 
development.188  The personality theory, then, seems to support the 
 
 186. The patent-eligibility criteria, including the novelty and non-obviousness requirements, 
ensure the uniqueness of an invention.  See, as to the tendency of inventors to strongly identify with 
their inventions, Merges, supra note 105, at 90 n.61. 
 187. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 81-82 (noting that the personality theory mandates a 
balance between the personality theory of the creator in her work and the personality interest of 
consumers who will use her work in their own future acts of creation). 
 188. It could theoretically be argued that there are enough opportunities to engage in research 
and development even without using patented inventions.  But see discussion supra Part III.B.1 
(with respect to the Lockean proviso that enough is left for others).   
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argument that there is a need to adopt an experimental use exception in 
patent law, allowing the use of an invention for research and 
development purposes even without the original inventor’s 
permission.189  This conclusion is not limited to a specific scenario of 
cumulative innovation.190  If, alongside such exception, there would be a 
rule ensuring that the original inventor is compensated for the use of her 
invention, at least in cases where such use has resulted in the 
development of a successful follow-on invention, then the damage to the 
personality interest of the first inventor resulting from the adoption of an 
experimental use exception would be mitigated.191   
To be sure, after the development of a follow-on invention, the 
follow-on inventor may have a personality interest in it.  In order to 
protect her personality interest, the follow-on inventor should be allowed 
to register a patent, provided that her invention meets the general criteria 
for patent-eligibility.  The personality theory, then, supports the 
conclusion that the registration of a patent for a follow-on invention 
should be allowed.192   
The realization that each inventor has a personality interest in her 
invention supports the conclusion that each inventor should be allowed 
to commercially exploit her patent and, while doing so, develop a unique 
identity and earn recognition from others, as explained above.  The 
original inventor may, in most cases, continue exploiting her patent even 
after the development of a follow-on invention and the registration of a 
patent for it.193  However, in order to ensure the ability of the second 
inventor to do so as well, assuming that the exploitation of the follow-on 
invention is considered within the scope of the original invention,194 
 
 189. Cf. William W. Fisher III, Symposium Cyberspace & The Law: Privacy, Property, and 
Crime in the Virtual Frontier: The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1417, 1471-72 (2010) (maintaining that user innovation offers opportunities for self-fulfillment and 
recommending that “[t]he government, through law, should therefore strive to open more 
opportunities for user innovation than manufacturers and the current population of users, left to their 
own devices, would create”). 
 190. For a similar conclusion under the labor theory, see supra note 132 and accompanying 
text.  Cf. supra note 57 (describing various approaches taken by scholars analyzing the matter from 
an economic perspective to the question of how wide the experimental use exception should be). 
 191. See also infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 192. For a similar conclusion under the labor theory, see supra notes 107-09 and 
accompanying text.  
 193. This would not be true in the case of an improvement that completely substitutes for the 
original invention.  See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text as to the improvements scenario. 
 194. This would be the case if an “Absolute Scope Principle” in patent law is embraced.  See 
supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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liability rule doctrines should be adopted.195  The main effects of liability 
rule doctrines would likely be to influence the negotiating positions of 
the inventors and to increase the likelihood that they reach a voluntary 
agreement.196  However, such a mechanism would also serve as a 
second-order solution for cases in which the parties do not reach an 
agreement.  In order to minimize the damage to the personality interest 
of the first inventor, the second inventor should be required to 
demonstrate good faith efforts to secure the first inventor’s consent as a 
condition for the activation of a liability rule.197  This way, the first 
inventor would be able to enjoy direct recognition by the follow-on 
inventor as the owner of the original patent.  Beyond that, the existence 
of an administrative or judicial proceeding to which the original inventor 
is a party and in which she is recognized as the owner of the original 
invention, alongside the fact that she is entitled to ongoing royalties for 
the non-permitted use of her invention, may lessen the damage to her 
personality interest.198 
Ultimately, there does not appear to be significant harm to the 
personality interest of the original inventor under the suggested regime.  
Notably, it is only proposed that the rights of the original inventor be 
curtailed in this narrow context of her relationship with other inventors, 
while with respect to her relationship with any other third party, she 
would continue to enjoy full property-like protection.   
D. Right of Attribution 
Inasmuch as the original inventor has a personality interest in her 
invention, the question arises whether the follow-on inventor should be 
required to give her credit in connection with the follow-on invention.   
A right of attribution exists under copyright law in many legal 
systems.199  Various scholars have noted the link between the personality 
justification and the right of attribution as well as other moral rights 
granted to the author of a copyrighted work in certain legal systems.200  
 
 195. For a discussion of liability rule doctrines under economic theory, see supra note 60 and 
accompanying text.  
 196. See Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 762-63. 
 197. Cf. id. at 763. 
 198. This is certainly the case in comparison with the alternative regime of exemption doctrine, 
allowing free commercialization of follow-on inventions without any compensation to the original 
inventor.  For a discussion of such an alternative under the economic analysis, see supra note 59 and 
accompanying text. 
 199. See, in the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).  
 200. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 168. 
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In fact, under the patent laws of various countries, including the United 
States, there is also a certain degree of protection on the right of an 
inventor to be identified in connection with her invention.201  The 
obligation to credit the inventor seems to correlate with the notion that 
inventors have a personality interest in their inventions.  Crediting the 
inventor may strengthen her identification with the invention and 
increase the chance that she enjoy the recognition of others in 
connection with it.202  In the context of cumulative innovation, it seems 
that obligating the follow-on inventor to credit the original inventor can 
serve as another means to minimize the harm to the personality interest 
of the original inventor that may be caused by allowing others to use her 
invention for research and development purposes.203  This way, she 
would at least be able to receive public recognition as a contributor to 
the development of the follow-on invention.204  
An important question arising in this context is whether credit 
should be given to the private individual who developed the original 
invention or to the owner of the patent when they differ, as in the case of 
employee inventions205 or in other cases where the patent has been 
 
 201. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2006) (mandating that a patent application shall be made, or 
authorized to be made, by the inventor) and 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (requiring the applicant to 
“make oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor”).  The patent must be 
applied for by the inventor herself even if it is assigned immediately thereafter to her employer.  See 
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 57 
(2006) (stating that “American patent law has always required the true and original inventor to be 
identified in the patent application, even though patents are routinely issued to entities other than the 
inventor based on a pre-invention assignment agreement”). 
 202. An interesting example, showing how valuable attribution may be to developers of 
technological products, is the case of the open source software movement.  See Fisk, supra note 
201, at 88-89 (stating that open source software is “software for which the source code is freely 
available to the public.”).  While seeking to minimize intellectual property rights with respect to the 
software in order to maintain a robust public domain, open source licenses still typically insist on 
attribution.  Fisk, supra note 201, at 89-91.  
 203. The fine details of the suggested attribution right, including the exact means by which 
credit should be given, are yet to be conceived.  Due consideration must be given, inter alia, to the 
need to avoid overly burdening the follow-on inventor, especially in cases where her invention 
relies on multiple previously patented inventions.   
 204. Inasmuch as the expected glory associated with being credited as someone who 
contributed to the development of a follow-on invention plays a part in the initial motivation to 
invent the original invention, such credit can be justified under the economic theory as well.  See 
generally, as to the role that anticipated fame and reputation may have in the formation of an 
incentive to invent, supra note 22. 
 205. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (1999). 
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assigned by the inventor to another person.206  As explained above, in 
certain cases an owner by assignment of a patent may develop a 
personality interest as a result of her identification with the invention 
and her recognition by others as the owner of the rights in it.207  
However, to the extent that the personality interest in inventions is 
attributed to the fact that the personalities of inventors are embedded in 
their inventions,208 it seems more appropriate to require that the credit be 
given to the inventors themselves.  It should be noted that when the 
owner of the rights in the invention is a corporation, rather than a private 
individual, the personality interest is irrelevant, as the personality theory 
deals exclusively with interests of human beings.209  Assuming that most 
owners by assignment of patents are corporate entities, this further 
supports a rule whereby the credit is required to be given to the original 
inventor herself and not to the patent owner, in the case of a split 
between them.210   
E. Unique Scenarios 
Two unique situations warrant a special discussion with respect to 
the personality theory.  The first occurs when an employee develops an 
 
 206. The currently existing attribution regime in patent law (see supra note 201) relates to the 
right of the inventor vis-à-vis the owner of the patent (rather than any third parties) and thus, 
naturally, awards the right to the inventor herself.   
 207. See text accompanying supra note 186.  
 208. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 209. Cf. Cherensky, supra note 156, at 659-60 (pointing at the difficulties associated with a 
comparison between the personhood interests of humans and corporations).  Admittedly, as a 
substantial share of research and development activities in modern day society takes place in the 
research laboratories of universities, giant corporations or start-up companies, which end up owning 
the patents for the resulting inventions, this could serve as a general argument against the 
application of the personality theory to patent law.  However, to the extent that the theory is used to 
strengthen the rights of the individual inventor, as suggested herein with respect to the right of 
attribution, such critical argument is irrelevant.  Besides, even in the present, many inventions are 
developed by so-called “garage inventors.”  In fact, an increasingly common related phenomenon 
nowadays is the practice of “user innovation.”  Cf. Robert P. Merges, To Waive and Waive Not: 
Property and Flexibility in the Digital Era, 23rd Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, April 6, 2010, 
34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113, 113 (2011) (noting that even in an era when creative works can 
sometimes be made collectively, individual creative effort is still the crucial ingredient for many 
high quality works). See generally Fisher, supra note 189; Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as 
Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008).   
 210. The concept of a split between ownership of economic rights and ownership of moral 
rights with respect to an intellectual product is not new.  In legal systems that grant moral rights 
under copyright law, such rights are typically personal and they belong to the author even if she is 
not the owner of the economic rights.  See, in the United States, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (stating that 
“[o]nly the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work, 
whether or not the author is the copyright owner”). 
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invention that is then owned by her employer.211  Such employee may 
have a personality interest in the invention deriving from the fact that 
she developed it.  In order to preserve such interest and guarantee that 
the employee can continue realizing her personality, develop her 
identity, and receive recognition based on her relationship with the 
invention, it seems that she should be granted permission to develop 
follow-on inventions even after she has left her workplace without it 
being considered an infringement of the original patent.212  
The second unique scenario exists when the follow-on invention is 
an improvement of the original invention.213  In general, the personality 
theory does not seem to justify a right of the original inventor to use the 
follow-on invention.  The original inventor’s personality is reflected in 
her own invention, which can be continued to be used by her even after 
the development of a follow-on invention by another inventor.  Yet, in 
the improvement scenario, at least where the follow-on invention is a 
perfect substitute for the original invention, which completely drives it 
out of the market, the original inventor may no longer have an 
opportunity to continue basing her business and commercial activities 
upon her invention and may no longer be able to identify herself with it 
and acquire recognition from others based on her relationship to it.  The 
damage to the personality interest of the original inventor in this 
situation can be minimized by allowing the original inventor to use the 
follow-on invention and, thus, continue identifying herself and enjoying 
recognition by others with respect to such improved version of her 
invention.  Surely, if the original inventor gives her voluntary consent to 
the commercialization of the improvement, she can demand a cross-
license to use it herself as part of such a deal.  Yet, when the 
commercialization of the improvement is allowed only under a liability 
rule regime, such cross-license should be granted to the original inventor 
as part of the administrative or judicial decision to activate the liability 
rule.214  The grant of such cross-license should be taken into account in 
setting the royalty rates payable to the original inventor in order to avoid 
 
 211. See generally, with respect to employee inventions, Merges, supra note 205. 
 212. Cf. Hughes, supra note 166, at 125; Cherensky, supra note 156, at 662-64 (suggesting a 
“reverse shop-right”, allowing an employee to continue using an invention developed by her even 
after she leaves her workplace).    
 213. See generally supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 214. A provision mandating the grant of a cross-license to the original inventor as part of the 
decision to grant a compulsory license to exploit a follow-on invention can be found in the TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 31(l)(ii).  This provision is general in its application and not 
limited to the improvements scenario.  
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her over-compensation to the detriment of the follow-on inventor.215  As 
the justification for such cross-license to the original inventor is rooted 
in the personality theory, it should be non-assignable.  
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This Article calls for broader use of specific non-utilitarian 
considerations in the design of patent law beyond the commonly used 
economic theories.  The discussion focuses on two well-known theories 
used for the justification of property rights:  the labor theory, which 
maintains that every person has a right to the fruits of her labor, and the 
personality theory, which focuses on the role that property fulfills in 
allowing individuals to develop and realize their personalities.  The 
Article shows that these theories are applicable, to a great extent, to 
rights in inventions, and thus, they should be taken into account by 
policymakers in the patent arena.   
While the labor theory and the personality theory have their own 
shortcomings as analytical tools for the evaluation of legal rules, this 
Article demonstrates that they can often provide significant insights with 
respect to the optimal design of patent law.  Such insights may, in 
certain cases, be consistent with the ones arising out of the economic 
analysis of patent law or may support one particular direction among 
several possibilities pointed to by economic analysis.  Such 
considerations could also potentially point policymakers in a direction 
which is different or even contrary to the one suggested by economic 
analysis.  In such cases, policymakers would have to give priority to one 
group of considerations—presumably, the economic considerations 
traditionally governing the analysis of patent law—unless it is possible 
to find a multi-layered solution that somehow accommodates all relevant 
considerations.216  At times, the analysis in light of such non-utilitarian 
theories may even expose new issues that do not arise under economic 
analysis, yet warrant the attention of policymakers.  
With respect to the specific test case examined in this Article—the 
case of cumulative innovation—both the labor theory and the personality 
theory support the adoption of a wide experimental use exception 
 
 215. One of the questions that needs to be thought of in connection with such arrangement is 
whether such cross-license should be given automatically to the original inventor or only upon her 
request, when her alternative is to give up such licenses in return for a higher monetary 
compensation.   
 216. Cf. supra note 210 (describing an arrangement in copyright law allowing for a split 
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allowing free use of a patented invention in the development course of a 
follow-on invention in a variety of circumstances, thus adding to the 
force of certain economic considerations that point in this direction.217  
Other conclusions arising out of the analysis under these theories are:  
(1) the inventor of a follow-on invention should be entitled to register a 
patent for it;218 (2) the original inventor should be entitled to a portion of 
the profits in the market for the follow-on invention, and;219 (3) in case 
the inventors fail to reach a voluntary agreement allowing the 
commercialization of the follow-on invention, application of a liability 
rule is warranted.220  The fairness considerations underlying the labor 
theory guide policymakers to take into account, in calculating the 
royalties payable to the original inventor under a liability rule regime, 
the level of contribution of the original invention to the development of 
the follow-on invention.221  Beyond that, the analysis under the 
personality theory raises the important issue of attribution and supports a 
rule requiring the follow-on inventor to give credit to the original 
inventor in connection with the follow-on invention.222  Finally, the 
analysis under the personality theory supports the enactment of special 
rules, which would take into account the unique characteristics of two 
specific situations:  the employee-inventor situation and the 
improvements scenario.223   
This Article, thus, demonstrates the potential usefulness of 
integrating non-utilitarian considerations into the analysis of patent law.  
According due weight to such considerations would enhance the ability 
of scholars to recommend solutions to current policy problems.  Beyond 
that, it may ultimately result in a patent system that not only serves its 
prescribed economic goals but also promotes other important goals such 
 
 217. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); supra notes 188-90 
and accompanying text (under the personality theory).  See supra note 57 and accompanying text, as 
to the indecisiveness of economic analysis with respect to this matter.  See also Eisenberg, supra 
note 10, at 1030 (pointing out that “[n]either the incentive to invent theory nor the incentive to 
disclose theory offers any clear guidance in formulating a research exemption from infringement 
liability”). 
 218. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); supra note 192 
(under the personality theory).   
 219. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); text accompanying 
supra note 191 (under the personality theory).   
 220. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (under the labor theory); supra note 195 and 
accompanying text (under the personality theory).   
 221. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text. 
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